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Abstract: 
 
This constitutes a chapter of a book on ‘Poverty of Communism: The Game of Filling in  the 
Marxian Blanks’. Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of Marxism; it is so called, 
because its approach to the phenomena of nature is dialectical, and its interpretation of these 
phenomena, its theory, is materialistic. Though the term ‘dialectical materialism’ owes its 
origin to Plekhanov and Lenin, its first expositor was Engels, who simply called it ‘modern 
materialism’ and asserted that it was essentially connected with the name of Marx. The 
present paper traces out the historical development of dialectical materialism, starting with its 
Greek philosophical origin in Heraclitus, who stressed the unity of opposites in a world of 
change, and passing through the dialogues of Socrates, and logic of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, 
Chalybäus (famous for his exegetical characterization of Hegel’s dialectics in terms of thesis-
antithesis-synthesis triad) and Feuerbach, all culminating in Marxism. The paper also 
discusses the experimental games of Lenin and his followers in filling in the Marxian blanks 
in dialectical materialism. 
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“And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the 
light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by 
pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds 
himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the 
visible.”  
Plato, The Commonwealth 
 
As we have already noted, dialectical materialism is the world outlook of Marxism; it is so 
called, because its approach to the phenomena of nature is dialectical, and its interpretation of 
these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic. Though the term ‘dialectical materialism’ owes 
its origin to Plekhanov and Lenin, its first expositor was Engels, who simply called it 
‘modern materialism’, though he firmly asserts that it “is essentially connected with the name 
of Marx.” (Engels 1886 [1970]).  It goes without saying that the oldest and most authoritative 
exposition of the doctrine appeared in Engels’ Anti-Dühring (1878). Another important 
sourcebook is his Dialectics of Nature, written during 1873 – 1886 and published 
posthumously only in 1925. It is widely accepted that Anti-Dühring has been second only to 
Capital in boosting the dissemination of Marxian thought. The Italian Marxist theoretician, 
Antonio Labriola (1843-1904), wrote that this work is “the most accomplished work of 
critical socialism and contains in a nutshell the whole philosophy required for the thinkers of 
socialism” (Labriola 1897), and that “This work of Engels remains the unexcelled book in the 
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literature of socialism” (Part 4). According to Lenin, Anti-Dühring “is a wonderfully rich and 
instructive book”, “analysing highly important problems in the domain of philosophy, natural 
science and the social sciences” (Lenin 1895). However, it should be noted that dialectical 
materialism as formulated in Anti-Dühring has been traditionally regarded as the joint 
contribution of Marx and Engels. Engels himself admits: 
“I must note in passing that inasmuch as the mode of outlook expounded in this book 
was founded and developed in far greater measure by Marx, and only in an 
insignificant degree by myself, it was understood between us that this exposition of 
mine should not be issued without his knowledge. I read the whole manuscript to him 
before it was printed and the tenth chapter of the part of economics (From the Critical 
History) was written by Marx, but unfortunately had to be shortened somewhat by me 
for purely external reasons.  As a matter of fact, we had always been accustomed to 
helping each other out in special subjects.” (Engels 1878 [1947].  
The term ‘dialectics’ is derived from the Greek verb for ‘to talk’) and the preposition 
‘through’); the middle form means ‘talking over’, and means ‘I converse or discuss or 
debate’. The adjective then means ‘pertaining to dialectics, or to proficiency in dialectics’. In 
Greek philosophy the concept originally signified a ‘quest by means of dialogue’, as in the 
heuristic method of Socrates that found perfection in the dialogues (Phaidros) of Plato. The 
method consisted in competence in conversation, conducted in the form of a question-answer 
game aimed at bringing out the contradiction in the opponent’s arguments and thus reaching 
consensus regarding truth. Thus dialectics implied opposites and contradictions. Heraclitus, 
who stressed the unity of opposites in a world of change (“All things come into being by 
conflict of opposites, and ‘the whole’ flows like a stream.”), is commonly regarded as one of 
the pre-Socratic dialecticians. He hypothesized the oppositional processes as ‘strife’ and the 
apparently stable state, which he called ‘justice’, as a harmony of strife. He said: “Opposition 
brings concord; and out of discord comes the fairest harmony.”     
Aristotle, however, attributed the earliest use of dialectics to Zeno (c. 490 – 430 B. C.) of 
Elea, who defended the monistic doctrines of Parmenides through arguments based on 
paradoxes against opposing pluralist views. These paradoxes had the form of an antinomy, a 
special kind of reductio argument. That is, he sought to refute the hypotheses of opponents by 
drawing contradictory and thus unacceptable consequences from those hypotheses. Note that 
in the sense of the art of inference or argument based on reasoning, Zeno’s dialectics is 
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synonymous with logic; for example, consider the law of formal logic known as ‘removing 
method’ (if p implies q, and q is false, then p is false).  
The next historical turn was with the Sophists (the word is derived from the same Greek root 
as the words sophia (= ‘wisdom’) and  sophós (= ‘wise man’), the first encyclopaedists of the 
ancient world and the first in the history of philosophy to emerge as paid teachers of wisdom. 
They became the founders of the art of rhetoric, and they taught the free citizen of the city 
state to reason, to argue, to refute and prove, in short, to defend his own interests by rhetoric, 
public speaking, by ‘making the worse reason appear the better’, in order to win votes of the 
people (the demos), to obtain power by persuading the masses. Protagoras, famous for his 
humanism (“Man is the measure of all things”), was perhaps the greatest of the Sophists to 
employ this degenerate form of dialectic, which was called eristic  and ridiculed by Plato (for 
example, in Sophist and Euthydemus). Aristotle also dealt with the Sophists’ deliberate use of 
invalid argumentation and sophistical tricks in his Sophistical refutations. 
Unlike Sophists, Socrates used a refined form of the Zenonian paradoxes, called the elenchus 
(= ‘argument of disproof or refutation’), a prolonged argument that refutes the opponent’s 
hypothesis by getting him to draw from it, by means of a series of questions and answers, a 
consequence that contradicts it. The law of logic here is: “if p implies not-p, and not-p is true, 
then p is false”. Plato (through Socrates) put dialektikê above the Sophists’ rhetorikê. He 
introduced dialectics in Books VI and VII of the Republic as the power of thought capable of 
comprehending the highest level in the divided line of knowledge, that is, the intelligible 
world, the world of Ideas; in this sense, dialectical thinking is reason, which grasps the 
ultimate reality independent of the senses. He placed dialectics on top of other studies like a 
coping-stone, above which no other study could rightly be put.  
Aristotle argued that the innovations that might justly be ascribed to Socrates were epagogic 
arguments and universal definition, as elenchus had already belonged to Zeno. In the logic of 
Aristotle, ‘induction’, (a move from particulars to the universal) is opposed to argument by 
syllogism, a logical argument in which one proposition (the conclusion) results of necessity 
from two assumptions (each called the premise). Note the core notion of ‘resulting of 
necessity’, which corresponds to a modern notion of logical consequence: R results of 
necessity from P and Q if it would be impossible for R to be false when P and Q are true. 
Aristotle considered dialectics in Organon, the standard collection of his six works: 
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Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical 
Refutations, where formal logic emerged out of the dialectical logic of Plato.  
With Aristotle, dialectics suffered a devaluation again, falling into the proximity of sophistry, 
from which Socrates (Plato) had earlier rescued it.  Aristotle (in Metaphysics) tried to explain 
Plato’s ontology through his method; Plato (according to Aristotle) introduced the notion of 
the Ideas on account of his preoccupation with dialectics. In Aristotelian logic, dialectics, on 
the other hand, was essentially a téchnê of persuasion, based on probable premises, in 
contrast to the apodictic scientific character of philosophy. Thus in the Topics, he defined a 
dialectical deduction as one in which its conclusion results of necessity from its premises, 
which are generally accepted. He often contrasted dialectics with demonstration, ‘a deduction 
that produces knowledge’, or ‘scientific deduction’, based on ‘true and primary’ premises. 
The Posterior Analytics contains his account (epistemology) of demonstrations and their role 
in knowledge. For him, science is knowledge of causes and in a demonstration, knowledge of 
the (true and primary) premises is what brings about knowledge of the conclusion. Thus the 
difference between dialectical arguments and demonstrations lies in the character of their 
premises, not in their logical structure. He also noted another equally important difference 
between the two methods: the premises of dialectical arguments are questions; there are two 
parties to a dialectical argument, the questioner and the answerer. In demonstration, on the 
other hand, one chooses as premises the true and primary propositions, assertions, that 
underlie the truth, without reference to any audience.  
Euclides of Megara (c. 430 – 360 B.C.), a pupil of Socrates and the founder of the Megarian 
or Eristic school, also was a notable logician and his tradition was continued by the 
‘Dialectical school’, a group of Megarian philosophers active from the later 4th to the mid 3rd 
centuries B.C., known as members of the Dialectic sect or as dialecticians. Clinomachus of 
Thurii (4th century B.C.), a pupil of Eubulides of Miletus, (4th century B.C., famous for his 
paradoxes), is regarded as founder of the sect; and the name ‘Dialectical school’ is said to 
have been introduced by Dionysius of Chalcedon, who flourished around 320 B.C. One of the 
two best known philosophers of the sect was Diodorus Cronus (4th century B.C.; the 
nickname Cronus = ‘Old Fogey’). Notable for logical innovations, he proposed the problem 
of future contingents: identifying possibility with necessity, so that the future is as certain and 
defined as the past. He defined the possible as “that which either is or will be true” (Kneale 
and Kneale 1963), and the necessary as what is true and will not be false. The problem lies in 
its conflict with freedom, the power to determine the future course of events, which seems 
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impossible if what happens, or does not happen, was necessarily going to happen, or not 
going to happen. 
His most famous pupil, Zeno of Citium, was the founder of the Stoic school. The other 
important philosopher of the Dialectical school, the logician Philo was also his pupil. With 
both the dialecticians and the Stoics (from the 3rd century B.C.), dialectics became a 
specialized discipline as a part of logic.  Dialectics as the right discourse in the form of a 
series of questions and answers was distinguished from rhetoric in the form of uninterrupted 
monologue. Dialectics for them included the study of referential sounds (phonetics) and also 
the study of the meaning-relations of sounds. Objects of meanings were considered things 
themselves that lie outside language and dialectics is therefore concerned only in so far as 
they are expressed in languages. 
‘Dialectics’ continued to be another name for logic in the Middle Ages also; thus Da  
Dialectica was the title of the first medieval logical treatise of Alcuin of York (730/740 – 
804), English scholar and an important architect of the Carolingian Renaissance (a period of 
intellectual and cultural revival from the late eighth century during the reigns of the 
Carolingian rulers Charlemagne and Louis the Pious), and  Dialectica was an important work 
of Pierre Abélard (1079 – 1142), French scholastic philosopher and logician, along with Logic for 
Beginners and Logic in response to the request of our comrades. 
According to Hegel, dialectics had so far been “held to be merely the art of practising 
deceptions and producing illusions”, and assumed to be “only a spurious game, the whole of 
its power resting solely on concealment of the deceit”, yielding some “subjective illusion” as 
its results.  
“Kant rated dialectic higher – and this is among his greatest merits – for he freed it 
from the seeming arbitrariness which it possessed from the standpoint of ordinary 
thought and exhibited it as a necessary function of reason.” (Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason asserted that the ancients had employed dialectics as ‘the 
logic of illusion’. With him, however, ‘dialectics’ changed from an illusory logic to a theory 
of illusion.  He distinguished the transcendental illusion from empirical illusion (for example, 
optical illusion) and from logical illusion:  
“Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason (the 
illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from a want of due attention to 
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logical rules. So soon as the attention is awakened to the case before us, this illusion 
totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, 
even after it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by means of 
transcendental criticism. Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition: “The 
world must have a beginning in time.” The cause of this is as follows. In our reason, 
subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules 
and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective 
principles. Now from this cause it happens that the subjective necessity of a certain 
connection of our conceptions, is regarded as an objective necessity of the 
determination of things in themselves. This illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as 
we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is 
near the shore, because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, 
which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from 
seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he is not 
deceived by this illusion.” (Kant 1787) 
He titled the second division of his ‘Transcendental Logic’ that contains this element of his 
theory of knowledge as ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, concerned with exposing the illusion of 
transcendental judgments, that is, judgments thought to pass beyond the limits of experience: 
“Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory 
appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding us against it; but to make it, as 
in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly 
beyond its power. For we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion, 
which rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as objective, while 
logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms, has to do merely with an error in the 
logical consequence of the propositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in 
imitation of the natural error. There is, therefore, a natural and unavoidable dialectic 
of pure reason – not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite knowledge, 
involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but 
that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its 
illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason 
into momentary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove.” (ibid.).  
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At the start of Book II of the second division, Kant identified three classes of dialectic 
mistakes or illusions of transcendent knowledge: the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the 
Ideals of Reason. He wrote: 
“Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding to the number of 
the ideas which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first 
class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject contains no 
manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I cannot in this manner 
attain to a conception. This dialectical argument I shall call the transcendental 
paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the 
transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a 
given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-
contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one 
side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The 
condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure 
reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from 
the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be 
given, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in 
general; that is, from things which I do not know in their mere transcendental 
conception, I conclude a being of all beings which I know still less by means of a 
transcendental conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no 
conception whatever. This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.” 
(Kant 1787) 
In Chapter I of the Book II, Kant analysed the paralogisms of pure reason; he argued that 
transcendental illusion results from a failure to distinguish between appearances and things-
in-themselves: 
“The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, 
be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental 
foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In 
this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is 
the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion.” (Kant 1787) 
The next chapter dealt with the antinomy of pure reason, the conflicts of the transcendental 
ideas. For him, the antinomies were the unresolved dialogue between skepticism and 
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dogmatism about knowledge of the world. He identified four antinomies; each antinomy has 
a thesis and an antithesis, both of which can be validly proved, and since each makes a 
transcendental claim, beyond the grasp of spatiotemporal sensation, neither can be confirmed 
nor denied by experience. The four conflicts are: 
(1)  Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in regard to space. 
Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in relation both 
to time and space, infinite. 
Kant’s observation:  Both are false. The world is an object of experience. Neither 
statement is based on experience. 
(2)  Thesis: Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there 
exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts. 
Antithesis: No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there does 
not exist in the world any simple substance. 
Kant’s observation: Both are false. Things are objects of experience. Neither 
statement is based on experience. 
(3)  Thesis: Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to 
originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to 
account fully for these phenomena. 
Antithesis: There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens 
solely according to the laws of nature. 
Kant’s observation:  Both may be true. The thesis may be true of things-in-themselves 
(other than as they appear). The antithesis may be true of things as they appear. 
(4)  Thesis: There exists either in, or in connection with the world – either as a part of it, 
or as the cause of it-an absolutely necessary being. 
Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world, or out of 
it – as its cause. 
Kant’s observation:  Both may be true. The thesis may be true of things-in-themselves 
(other than as they appear). The antithesis may be true of things as they appear. 
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Finally he observed: 
“The reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast. The very same 
grounds of proof which established in the thesis the existence of a supreme being, 
demonstrated in the antithesis – and with equal strictness – the non-existence of such 
a being. We found, first, that a necessary being exists, because the whole time past 
contains the series of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the unconditioned (the 
necessary); secondly, that there does not exist any necessary being, for the same 
reason, that the whole time past contains the series of all conditions – which are 
themselves, therefore, in the aggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming 
incongruity is as follows. We attend, in the first argument, solely to the absolute 
totality of the series of conditions, the one of which determines the other in time, and 
thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned. In the second, we consider, on the contrary, 
the contingency of everything that is determined in the series of time – for every event 
is preceded by a time, in which the condition itself must be determined as conditioned 
– and thus everything that is unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears. In 
both, the mode of proof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human 
reason, which often falls into discord with itself, from considering an object from two 
different points of view. Herr von Mairan regarded the controversy between two 
celebrated astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice of a 
proper standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a separate 
treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the moon revolves on its own axis, 
because it constantly presents the same side to the earth; the other declared that the 
moon does not revolve on its own axis, for the same reason. Both conclusions were 
perfectly correct, according to the point of view from which the motions of the moon 
were considered.” (Kant 1787) 
Kant was able to resolve the seemingly irreconcilable claims (thesis and antithesis) and to 
reject both the first two and accept the other two, by comprehending their origin in the 
conflict of the faculties and by recognizing their proper domains of knowledge. For all of the 
antinomies, the domain of the thesis is the intellectual, noumenal, world, while that of the 
antithesis is the spatiotemporal, phenomenal, world. He argued that rationalism developed by 
defending the thesis of each antinomy and empiricism, the antithesis. 
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Note that even though Kant, in his Transcendental Dialectic, had analyzed the antinomies of 
pure reason as four sets of ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’, he had not named his resolution of the 
antinomies a ‘synthesis’. It was his successor Johann Gottlieb Fichte who, in his 
‘Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge’ (1794–95), first introduced into the 
German philosophy the triad or three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Fichte, 
however, did not believe that antithesis could be deduced from thesis and that synthesis could 
achieve anything more than uniting what both thesis and antithesis had established. Also note 
that his conception was taken up by Friedrich Schelling, but not as such by G. W. F. Hegel, 
who, despite his fondness for dialectics, did not set it up in a triadic form.  The triad was 
imposed on his philosophy in 1837 by the German philosopher Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus 
(1796–1862) in his exegetical work on philosophy Historical Survey of Speculative 
Philosophy from Kant to Hegel. Hegelian dialectics involved the process of the passing over 
of thoughts or concepts into their opposites and their attaining a higher unity. And even his 
doctrine that dialectics is not just a process of thought but also found in history and in the 
whole universe was not something new (as we will see in the next Chapter), and he himself 
recognized his predecessors in Heraclitus and the Greek Neoplatonist Proclus Lycaeus (412 –
485 AD).  
Hegel regarded the “passing over into the opposite” as a natural consequence of the limited or 
finite nature of a concept or thing. The contradictions that emerge in this way in 
consciousness, nature, and society, according to him, lead, by a kind of necessity, to a further 
phase of development. He summed up his dialectics in these lines in The Science of Logic: 
“In the Phenomenology of Mind I have expounded an example of this method in 
application to a more concrete object, namely to consciousness. Here we are dealing 
with forms of consciousness each of which in realising itself at the same time resolves 
itself, has for its result its own negation – and so passes into a higher form. All that is 
necessary to achieve scientific progress – and it is essential to strive to gain this quite 
simple insight – is the recognition of the logical principle that the negative is just as 
much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, 
into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular 
content, in other words, that such a negation is not all and every negation but the 
negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a 
specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it 
results; which strictly speaking is a tautology, for otherwise it would be an 
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immediacy, not a result. Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation, it has 
content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its predecessor; for it is richer 
by the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, but also something 
more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system of 
Notions as such has to be formed – and has to complete itself in a purely continuous 
course in which nothing extraneous is introduced.” (Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
At the start of his ‘Preface’ to The Phenomenology of Mind (1807) he had written: 
 “The more the ordinary mind takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, 
the more is it accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given 
philosophical system, and only to see reason for the one or the other in any 
explanatory statement concerning such a system. It does not conceive the diversity of 
philosophical systems as the progressive evolution of truth; rather, it sees only 
contradiction in that variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, 
and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the 
fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, 
for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not 
merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one 
another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the 
same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one 
another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all 
moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. But contradiction as 
between philosophical systems is not wont to be conceived in this way; on the other 
hand, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to relieve 
it or keep it free from its one-sidedness, and to recognise in what seems conflicting 
and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments.” (Hegel 
1807 [1967]). 
According to him, the epoch signified “a birth-time and a period of transition”, with both a 
quantitative and a qualitative change, “as in the case of the birth of a child”. It goes without 
saying that this idea had an irresistible attraction for Marx and his followers: 
“……. it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. 
The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing, and with 
the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the 
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past and to set about its own transformation. It is indeed never at rest, but carried 
along the stream of progress ever onward. But it is here as in the case of the birth of a 
child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth 
in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn – there 
is a break in the process, a qualitative change and the child is born. In like manner the 
spirit of the time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, 
disintegrates one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world. That it 
is tottering to its fall is indicated only by symptoms here and there. Frivolity and again 
ennui, which are spreading in the established order of things, the undefined 
foreboding of something unknown – all these betoken that there is something else 
approaching. This gradual crumbling to pieces, which did not alter the general look 
and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, which, in a flash and at a single 
stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world. 
“But this new world is perfectly realised just as little as the new-born child; and it is 
essential to bear this in mind. It comes on the stage to begin with in its immediacy, in 
its bare generality. A building is not finished when its foundation is laid; and just as 
little, is the attainment of a general notion of a whole the whole itself. When we want 
to see an oak with all its vigour of trunk, its spreading branches, and mass of foliage, 
we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. In the same way science, the 
crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not found complete in its initial stages. The 
beginning of the new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold 
forms of spiritual culture; it is the reward which comes after a chequered and devious 
course of development, and after much struggle and effort. It is a whole which, after 
running its course and laying bare all its content, returns again to itself; it is the 
resultant abstract notion of the whole. But the actual realisation of this abstract whole 
is only found when those previous shapes and forms, which are now reduced to ideal 
moments of the whole, are developed anew again, but developed and shaped within 
this new medium, and with the meaning they have thereby acquired.” (Hegel 1807 
[1967]) 
Though Hegel found nothing praiseworthy about the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, the 
objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which Kant had introduced 
commanded his admiration.  He elaborated in The Science of Logic: 
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“That which enables the Notion to advance itself is the …. negative which it 
possesses within itself; it is this which constitutes the genuine dialectical moment. 
Dialectic in this way acquires an entirely different significance from what it had when 
it was considered as a separate part of Logic and when its aim and standpoint were, 
one may say, completely misunderstood. Even the Platonic dialectic, in the 
Parmenides itself and elsewhere even more directly, on the one hand, aims only at 
abolishing and refuting assertions through themselves and on the other hand, has for 
its result simply nothingness. 
“Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external, negative activity which does not 
pertain to the subject matter itself, having its ground in mere conceit as a subjective 
itch for unsettling and destroying what is fixed and substantial, or at least having for 
its result nothing but the worthlessness of the object dialectically considered. 
“True, Kant’s expositions in the antinomies of pure reason, when closely examined 
…., do not indeed deserve any great praise; but the general idea on which he based his 
expositions and which he vindicated, is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity 
of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations: primarily, 
it is true, with the significance that these determinations are applied by reason to 
things in themselves; but their nature is precisely what they are in reason and with 
reference to what is intrinsic or in itself. 
“This result, grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else but the inner negativity of 
the determinations as their self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual 
life.  
“But if no advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of dialectic, the result 
is only the familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite; a strange 
result for — since the infinite is the Reasonable — it asserts that reason is incapable 
of knowing the Reasonable.  
“It is in this dialectic as it is here understood, that is, in the grasping of opposites in 
their unity or of the positive in the negative, that speculative thought consists. 
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“It is the most important aspect of dialectic, but for thinking which is as yet 
unpractised and unfree it is the most difficult. Such thinking, if it is still engaged in 
breaking itself of the habit of employing sensuously concrete terms and of 
ratiocination, must first practise abstract thinking, hold fast Notions in their 
determinateness and learn to cognise by means of them. An exposition of logic to this 
end would, in its method, have to keep to the division of the subject above-mentioned 
and with regard to the more detailed contents, to the definitions given for the 
particular Notions without touching on the dialectical aspect. As regards its external 
structure, such an exposition would resemble the usual presentation of this science, 
but it would also be distinguished from it with respect to the content and still would 
serve for practice in abstract thinking, though not in speculative thinking, a purpose 
which can never be realised by the logic which has become popular through the 
addition of psychological and anthropological material. It would give to mind the 
picture of a methodically ordered whole, although the soul of the structure, the 
method (which dwells in the dialectical aspect) would not itself appear in it.” (Hegel 
1812 [1969]). 
In Hegel’s monism, dialectic is characterized by its complete identification of the process of 
consciousness with the process of being. For him, if the Absolute must explain everything, it 
must not be just a pure identity, but a unity-in-difference, signifying the complete realization 
of the finite in the infinite, unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea. His logic was 
metaphysics itself: a philosophy of being as revealed through abstract thought. His starting-
point was the concept of pure, absolute, indeterminate being, conceived as a dynamic 
process.  He sought to trace the evolution of this dynamic process through three stages:  
i) the stage in which it posits itself (as thesis);  
ii) the stage of negation, a necessary corollary of the previous stage (antithesis) and 
iii) the stage of union of opposites (synthesis). 
 
Hegel starts with the bare notion of existence, or being, and argues that since this bare notion 
of being has no content at all, it cannot be anything. Thus it must be nothing, the antithesis of 
being. Being and nothing, however, are opposites, constantly moving in and apart from each 
other; they require to be brought together under the synthesis, becoming. 
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An illustration of the a priori dialectic process by which all the categories of thought and 
reality are evolved from the pure, indeterminate being is as follows. Every conception has 
within itself deficiency, and deficiency is negation; positing the conception of being involves 
its differentiation from ‘nothing’ and thus implies the negation of being. This ‘being-nought’ 
relation of affirmation leads by synthesis to a richer positive concept of ‘becoming’ or 
origination. In short, the process represents a game of thesis, negating antithesis, and the 
synthesis that negates this negation and sublates the opposition. (Note that the Hegelian term 
‘sublation’ means to take something beyond its own limits and ‘negating’ it, that is to say, by 
maintaining what is necessary in the former relation while terminating that which is no 
longer tenable.) Thus Hegel was concerned with those common dialectical stages of life such 
as coming into being, growing, and passing away in both the realms of natural and 
intellectual life, which he illustrated with his famous ‘bud-blossom-fruit’ dialectics.  
He discussed this ‘being-nothing-becoming’ relationship in detail in his Science of Logic, 
admitting his debt to the ancient predecessors. 
“It was the Eleatics, above all Parmenides, who first enunciated the simple thought of 
pure being as the absolute and sole truth: only being is, and nothing absolutely is not, 
and in the surviving fragments of Parmenides this is enunciated with the pure 
enthusiasm of thought which has for the first time apprehended itself in its absolute 
abstraction. As we know, in the oriental systems, principally in Buddhism, nothing, 
the void, is the absolute principle. Against that simple and one-sided abstraction the 
deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward the higher, total concept of becoming and 
said: being as little is, as nothing is, or, all flows, which means, all is a becoming. The 
popular, especially oriental proverbs, that all that exists has the germ of death in its 
very birth, that death, on the other hand, is the entrance into new life, express at 
bottom the same union of being and nothing. But these expressions have a substratum 
in which the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time, are 
conceived as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction and 
consequently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely the same….. 
“It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of being and nothing in every 
example, in every actual thing or thought.” (Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
Engels (as we will see later on) talked about three laws of dialectics, namely, the law of the 
transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, the law of the interpenetration of 
18 
 
opposites and the law of the negation of the negation. All three were developed by Hegel: the 
first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being as well as in Section 108 of the 
Encyclopedia; the second in the second part of the Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; and the 
third as the basis of the whole system. Hegel tried to substantiate the first law in terms of 
proportions in the constitution of things and in the ‘Remark’, gave examples of water turning, 
at critical points (or “nodal lines of measure-relations”), into ice or steam, and of chemical 
combinations and constant proportions, which Engels and Marx repeated later. Hegel 
explained: 
 “Here we have a measure relation, a self-subsistent reality which is qualitatively 
distinguished from others. Such a being-for-self, because it is at the same time 
essentially a relation of quanta, is open to externality and to quantitative alteration; it 
has a range within which it remains indifferent to this alteration and does not change 
its quality. But there enters a point in this quantitative alteration at which the quality is 
changed and the quantum shows itself as specifying, so that the altered quantitative 
relation is converted into a measure, and thus into a new quality, a new something. 
The relation which has taken the place of the first is determined by this, partly 
according to the qualitative identity of the moments which are in affinity, and partly 
according to the quantitative continuity. But because the difference falls into this 
quantitative aspect, the relation between the new something and its predecessor is one 
of indifference; their difference is the external one of quantum. The new something 
has therefore not emerged from or developed out of its predecessor but directly from 
itself, that is, from the inner specifying unity which has not yet entered into existence. 
The new quality or new something is subjected to the same progressive alteration, and 
so on to infinity.” (Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
Then he gave a large number of examples of such nodal lines in terms of the acquisition of 
new properties by numbers as the series of natural numbers develops; the acquisition of new 
features by the notes of a musical scale; chemical combinations; water changing into ice or 
steam; birth and death; a moral example, based on Aristotle, of slight changes that turn 
virtues into vices, carelessness into crime, etc. and a political example, borrowed from Baron 
de Montesquieu, of the relation of a type of constitution to the population of a state: 
 “The system of natural numbers already shows a nodal line of qualitative moments 
which emerge in a merely external succession. It is on the one hand a merely 
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quantitative progress and regress, a perpetual adding or subtracting, so that each 
number has the same arithmetical relation to the one before it and after it, as these 
have to their predecessors and successors, and so on. But the numbers so formed also 
have a specific relation to other numbers preceding and following them, being either 
an integral multiple of one of them or else a power or a root. In the musical scale 
which is built up on quantitative differences, a quantum gives rise to a harmonious 
relation without its own relation to those on either side of it in the scale differing from 
the relation between these again and their predecessors and successors. While 
successive notes seem to be at an ever-increasing distance from the keynote, or 
numbers in succeeding each other arithmetically seem only to become other numbers, 
the fact is that there suddenly emerges a return, a surprising accord, of which no hint 
was given by the quality of what immediately preceded it, but which appears as an 
actio in distans, as a connection with something far removed. There is a sudden 
interruption of the succession of merely indifferent relations which do not alter the 
preceding specific reality or do not even form any such, and although the succession 
is continued quantitatively in the same manner, a specific relation breaks in per 
saltum. 
“Such qualitative nodes and leaps occur in chemical combinations when the mixture 
proportions are progressively altered; at certain points in the scale of mixtures, two 
substances form products exhibiting particular qualities. These products are 
distinguished from one another not merely by a more or less, and they are not already 
present, or only perhaps in a weaker degree, in the proportions close to the nodal 
proportions, but are bound up with these nodes themselves. For example, different 
oxides of nitrogen and nitric acids having essentially different qualities are formed 
only when oxygen and nitrogen are combined in certain specific proportions, and no 
such specific compounds are formed by the intermediate proportions. Metal oxides, 
e.g. the lead oxides, are formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are 
distinguished by colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one 
another; the proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a 
specific substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific 
compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses characteristic 
qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not merely get more or 
less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the solid or gaseous states; these 
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states do not appear gradually; on the contrary, each new state appears as a leap, 
suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual succession of temperature changes at 
these points. Every birth and death, far from being a progressive gradualness, is an 
interruption of it and is the leap from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration. 
“It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking 
when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by 
representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the 
alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into 
another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other 
which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively 
different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually 
harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the 
consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at 
freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into 
the solid state….. 
“In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under the categories of being, there 
occurs the same transition from quantity into quality and different qualities appear to 
be based in a difference of magnitude. 
“It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness is 
exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus right 
becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their quantitative 
difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct qualitative character. With the 
expansion of the state and an increased number of citizens, the laws and the 
constitution acquire a different significance. The state has its own measure of 
magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere change of size renders it liable to 
instability and disruption under that same constitution which was its good fortune and 
its strength before its expansion.” (Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
The second law, that of the interpenetration of opposites, was formulated first in his ‘Law of 
Diversity’ (“All things are different, or, there are no two things like each other.”) and then in  
‘The Law of Contradiction’ working behind the ‘being-nothing-becoming’ relationship: 
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“If, now, the first determinations of reflection, namely, identity, difference and 
opposition, have been put in the form of a law, still more should the determination 
into which they pass as their truth, namely, contradiction, be grasped and enunciated 
as a law: everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in 
contrast to the others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things. The 
contradiction which makes its appearance in opposition, is only the developed nothing 
that is contained in identity and that appears in the expression that the law of identity 
says nothing. This negation further determines itself into difference and opposition, 
which now is the posited contradiction. 
“But it is one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of 
ordinary thinking that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent 
a determination as identity; but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two 
determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have to be 
taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence. For as 
against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of 
dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so 
far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity. 
“Now as regards the assertion that there is no contradiction, that it does not exist, this 
statement need not cause us any concern; an absolute determination of essence must 
be present in every experience, in everything actual, as in every notion. We made the 
same remark above in connection with the infinite, which is the contradiction as 
displayed in the sphere of being. But common experience itself enunciates it when it 
says that at least there is a host of contradictory things, contradictory arrangements, 
whose contradiction exists not merely in an external reflection but in themselves. 
Further, it is not to be taken merely as an abnormality which occurs only here and 
there, but is rather the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of 
all self-movement, which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External, sensuous 
movement itself is contradiction’s immediate existence. Something moves, not 
because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same 
moment it is here and not here, because in this ‘here’, it at once is and is not. The 
ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in 
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motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, 
that motion is existent contradiction itself. 
“Similarly, internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general, (the appetite or 
nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else but 
the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and deficient, 
the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity has no vitality, but the positive, being in its 
own self a negativity, goes outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is 
therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this 
power to hold and endure the contradiction within it. But if an existent in its positive 
determination is at the same time incapable of reaching beyond its negative 
determination and holding the one firmly in the other, is incapable of containing 
contradiction within it, then it is not the living unity itself, not ground, but in the 
contradiction falls to the ground. Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that 
thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be 
dominated by it as in ordinary thinking, where its determinations are resolved by 
contradiction only into other determinations or into nothing.  
“If the contradiction in motion, instinctive urge, and the like, is masked for ordinary 
thinking, in the simplicity of these determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand, 
immediately represented in the determinations of relationship. The most trivial 
examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on ad infinitum, 
all contain opposition in each term. That is above, which is not below; ‘above’ is 
specifically just this, not to be ‘below’, and only is, in so far as there is a ‘below’; and 
conversely, each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and the 
son the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and at the same 
time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their being is a single 
subsistence. The father also has an existence of his own apart from the son-
relationship; but then he is not father but simply man; just as above and below, right 
and left, are each also a reflection-into-self and are something apart from their 
relationship, but then only places in general. Opposites, therefore, contain 
contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to one 
another or sublate each other and are indifferent to one another. Ordinary thinking 
when it passes over to the moment of the indifference of the determinations, forgets 
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their negative unity and so retains them merely as ‘differents’ in general, in which 
determination, right is no longer right, nor left, left, etc. But since it has, in fact, right 
and left before it, these determinations are before it as self-negating, the one being in 
the other, and each in this unity being not self-negating but indifferently for itself.”  
(Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
Thus, according to Hegel, everything is inherently contradictory, and contradiction is the root 
of all movement and vitality; that is, it is only in so far as something has a contradiction 
within it that it moves, has an urge and activity. Something is, in one and the same respect, 
self-contained and deficient, the negative of itself. Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction 
in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each 
other and are indifferent to one another. Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus (1796–1862; a German 
philosopher, famous for his exegetical characterization of Hegel’s dialectics in terms of 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad) in his exegetical work on philosophy interpreted this 
Hegelian dialectics as follows: 
“….. everywhere the idea or notion appears first of all in its immediateness, or 
intrinsic reality, that it then passes judgment upon itself or becomes resolved into its 
opposite, and ultimately coalesces from out these antagonisms. From this very method 
results the whole structure or subdivision of the system. The Absolute, the being-
thinking or Idee, has to pass through three momenta, and in the first place to present 
itself as bare idea in and for itself; secondly, in its differentiation or objective state, 
externality; and thirdly, as the idea that has returned from its externality into itself: in 
the first state it is the purely logical Idee, the thinking process taken in the stricter 
sense as such in and for itself; in the second, it is the Idee in its externality, or 
departure from itself into a temporospatial disjunctivity, i. e. nature; and in the third, 
it is the mind or intelligence. Accordingly, the whole of philosophy, or the thinking 
process, which has comprehended itself in this its active state, has three cardinal 
divisions – the Logic, which with Hegel, as is readily seen, implies also Metaphysics; 
the Philosophy of Nature; and Philosophy of Mind.” (Chalybäus 1837 [1854]) 
Chalybäus continued his exegesis and formulated the famous triad for Hegelian dialectics: 
“In [the] origination, being and naught are suppressed, i. e. simultaneously preserved 
and contained; for if we analyse what is implied by the act of becoming, it is seen to 
24 
 
be an alternating process of origination and evanescence, or of evanescence and 
origination, a continual transition from the being into the naught and a continual 
proceeding from the naught into being. 
“Such is the first Trilogy; the unity of being, naught, and origination, or of position, 
negation, and limitation; but, ….., we have not by the latter term to think of any 
external limitation, but only of the internal self-differencing of this movement, or of 
the oscillation and vibration between being and non-being. In this first methodical 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, whereof the latter consists in a process or course of 
gradually closer self-determination, we have at once an example or type of all 
succeeding theses, and shall understand these the more readily, by referring to the 
above simple movement of thought.” (Chalybäus 1837 [1854]). 
Thus appeared the much abused triad of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’, wrongly ascribed to 
Hegel for his ‘being-nought-becoming’ process – another instance of a filling-in of a 
philosophical blank. 
And thus began the ceaseless exploits of the triad on the wings of the speculative power of 
the Communist teachers. To start with, Karl Marx, in his famous response [in The Poverty of 
Philosophy 1847] to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809 – 1865, French politician, mutualist 
(anarchist) philosopher and socialist), explained that the movement of pure reason, according 
to Hegel, consists in 
“….. posing itself, opposing itself, composing itself; in formulating itself as thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis; or, yet, in affirming itself, negating itself, and negating its 
negation…… 
“But once it has managed to pose itself as a thesis, this thesis, this thought, opposed to 
itself, splits up into two contradictory thoughts – the positive and the negative, the yes 
and no. The struggle between these two antagonistic elements comprised in the 
antithesis constitutes the dialectical movement. The yes becoming no, the no 
becoming yes, the yes becoming both yes and no, the no becoming both no and yes, 
the contraries balance, neutralize, paralyze each other. The fusion of these two 
contradictory thoughts constitutes a new thought, which is the synthesis of them. This 
thought splits up once again into two contradictory thoughts, which in turn fuse into a 
new synthesis. Of this travail is born a group of thoughts. This group of thoughts 
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follows the same dialectic movement as the simple category, and has a contradictory 
group as antithesis. Of these two groups of thoughts is born a new group of thoughts, 
which is the synthesis of them.  
“Just as from the dialectic movement of the simple categories is born the group, so 
from the dialectic movement of the groups is born the series, and from the dialectic 
movement of the series is born the entire system.” (Marx 1847 [1975]).  
Feuerbach identified in his Principles of the Philosophy of the Future the culmination of 
modem philosophy in the Hegelian philosophy; according to him, the historical necessity and 
justification of the new philosophy (including pantheism, the philosophical outlook which 
identifies God with Nature, rather than seeing Nature as having been created or controlled by 
God) must be therefore derived mainly from a critique of Hegel’s. He argued:  
“The contradiction of the modern philosophy, especially of pantheism, consists of the 
fact that it is the negation of theology from the standpoint of theology or the negation 
of theology which itself is again theology; this contradiction especially characterises 
the Hegelian philosophy. 
“For modern philosophy, and hence also for Hegel, the non-material being or being as 
a pure object of the intellect, as a pure being of the intellect, is the only true and 
Absolute Being, that is, God. Even matter, which Spinoza turns into an attribute of the 
divine substance, is a metaphysical thing, a pure being of the intellect, for the 
essential determination of matter as distinguished from the intellect and the activity of 
thinking – that it is a passive being – is taken away from it. But Hegel differs from 
earlier philosophy by the fact that he determines the relationship of the material 
sensuous being to the non-material being differently. The earlier philosophers and 
theologians held the true divine being to be detached and liberated from nature; that 
is, from sensuousness or matter. They situated the toil of abstraction and self-
liberation from the sensuous in themselves in order to arrive at that which in itself is 
free from the sensuous. To this condition of being free, they ascribed the blissfulness 
of the divine, and to this self-liberation, the virtue of the human essence. Hegel, on the 
other hand, turned this subjective activity into the self-activity of the Divine Being. 
Even God must subject himself to this toil, and must, like pagan heroes, win his 
divinity through virtue. Only in this way does the freedom of the Absolute from 
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matter, which is, besides, only a precondition and a conception, become reality and 
truth. This self-liberation from matter, however, can be posited in God only if matter, 
too, is posited in him. But how can it be posited in him? Only in this way that he 
himself posits it. But in God there is only God. Hence, the only way to do this is that 
he posits himself as matter, as non-God; that is, as his otherness. In this way, matter is 
not an antithesis of the ego and the spirit, preceding them, as it were, in an 
incomprehensible way; it is the self-alienation of the Spirit. Thus, matter itself 
acquires spirit and intellect; it is taken over into the absolute essence as a moment in 
its life, formation, and development. But then, matter is again posited as an untrue 
being resembling nothingness in so far as only the being that restores itself out of this 
alienation, that is, that sheds matter and sensuousness off from itself, is pronounced to 
be the perfect being in its true form. The natural, material, and sensuous – and indeed, 
the sensuous, not in the vulgar and moral, but in the metaphysical sense – are 
therefore even here something to be negated, like nature which in theology has been 
poisoned by the original sin. Indeed, the sensuous is incorporated into reason, the ego, 
and the spirit, but it is something irrational, a note of discord within reason; it is the 
non-ego in the ego, that is, that which negates it. For example in Schelling nature in 
God is the non-divine in God; it is in God and yet outside him; the same is true of the 
body in the philosophy of Descartes which, although connected with me, that is, with 
the spirit, is nevertheless external, and does not belong to me, that is, to my essence; it 
is of no consequence, therefore, whether it is or is not connected with me. Matter will 
remain in contradiction to what is presupposed by philosophy as the true being. 
“Matter is indeed posited in God, that is, posited as God, and to posit matter as God is 
as much as saying, "There is no God," or as much as abolishing theology and 
recognising the truth of materialism. But the fact remains that the truth of theology is 
at the same time taken for granted. Atheism, the negation of theology, is therefore 
negated again; this means that theology is restored through philosophy. God is God 
only through the fact that he overcomes and negates matter; that is, the negation of 
God. And according to Hegel, it is only the negation of the negation that constitutes 
the true positing. And so in the end, we are back to whence we had started – in the lap 
of Christian theology. Thus, already in the most central principle of Hegel's 
philosophy we come across the principle and conclusion of his philosophy of religion 
to the effect that philosophy, far from abolishing the dogmas of theology, only 
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restores and mediates them through the negation of rationalism. The secret of Hegel's 
dialectic lies ultimately in this alone, that it negates theology through philosophy in 
order then to negate philosophy through theology. Both the beginning and the end are 
constituted by theology; philosophy stands in the middle as the negation of the first 
positedness, but the negation of the negation is again theology. At first everything is 
overthrown, but then everything is reinstated in its old place, as in Descartes. The 
Hegelian philosophy is the last grand attempt to restore a lost and defunct Christianity 
through philosophy, and, of course, as is characteristic of the modern era, by 
identifying the negation of Christianity with Christianity itself. The much-extolled 
speculative identity of spirit and matter, of the infinite and the finite, of the divine and 
the human is nothing more than the wretched contradiction of the modern era having 
reached its zenith in metaphysics. It is the identity of belief and unbelief, theology and 
philosophy, religion and atheism, Christianity and paganism. This contradiction 
escapes the eye and is obfuscated in Hegel only through the fact that the negation of 
God, or atheism, is turned by him into an objective determination of God; God is 
determined as a process, and atheism as a moment within this process. But a belief 
that has been reconstructed out of unbelief is as little true belief – because it is always 
afflicted with its antithesis – as the God who has been reconstructed out of hi negation 
is a true God; he is rather a self-contradictory, an atheistic God.” (Feuerbach 1843). 
Against Hegel’s dialectic of Absolute Knowledge, Feuerbach claimed to reintroduce 
dialectics back into the dialogical situation; he maintained in his Principles of the Philosophy 
of the Future: 
 “The true dialectic is not a monologue of the solitary thinker with himself. It is a 
dialogue between “I” and “You”.” (Feuerbach 1843). 
He elaborated this idea in his 1839 article Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy: 
“A twosome is needed to prove something. While proving, the thinker splits himself 
into two; he contradicts himself, and only after a thought has been and has overcome 
its own opposition, can it be regarded as proved. To prove is at the same time to 
refute. Every intellectual determination has its antithesis, its contradiction. Truth 
exists not in unity with, but in refutation of its opposite. Dialectics is not a monologue 
that speculation carries on with itself, but a dialogue between speculation and 
empirical reality. A thinker is a dialectician only in so far as he is his own opponent. 
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The zenith of art and of one’s own power is to doubt oneself. Hence, if philosophy or, 
in our context, the Logic wishes to prove itself true, it must refute rational empiricism 
or the intellect which denies it and which alone contradicts it. Otherwise all its proofs 
will be nothing more than subjective assurances, so far as the intellect is concerned. 
The antithesis of being – in general and as regarded by the Logic – is not nothingness, 
but sensuous and concrete being……. 
“The only philosophy that proceeds from no presuppositions at all is one that 
possesses the courage and freedom to doubt itself, that produces itself out of its 
antithesis. All modern philosophies, however, begin only with themselves and not 
with what is in opposition to them. They presuppose philosophy; that is, what they 
understand by philosophy to be the immediate truth. They understand by mediation 
only elucidation, as in the case of Fichte, or development, as in the case of Hegel. 
Kant was critical towards the old metaphysics, but not towards himself. Fichte 
proceeded from the assumption that the Kantian philosophy was the truth. All he 
wanted was to raise it to “science,” to link together that which in Kant had a 
dichotomized existence, by deriving it from a common principle. Similarly, Schelling 
proceeded from the assumption that the Fichtean philosophy was the established truth, 
and restored Spinoza in opposition to Fichte. As far as Hegel is concerned, he is a 
Fichte as mediated through a Schelling. Hegel polemicized against the Absolute of 
Schelling; he thought it lacked the moment of reflection, apprehension, and 
negativity. In other words, he imbued the Absolute Identity with Spirit, introduced 
determinations into it, and fructified its womb with the semen of the Notion (the ego 
of Fichte). But he, nevertheless, took the truth of the Absolute for granted. He had no 
quarrel with the existence or the objective reality of Absolute Identity; he actually 
took for granted that Schelling’s philosophy was, in its essence, a true philosophy. All 
he accused it of was that it lacked form. Hence, Hegel’s relationship to Schelling is 
the same as that of Fichte to Kant. To both the true philosophy was already in 
existence, both in content and substance; both were motivated by a purely “scientific,” 
that is, in this case, systematic and formal interest. Both were critics of certain 
specific qualities of the existing philosophy, but not at all of its essence. That the 
Absolute existed was beyond all doubt. All it needed was to prove itself and be known 
as such. In this way it becomes a result and an object of the mediating Notion; that is, 
a “scientific” truth and not merely an assurance given by intellectual intuition. 
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“But precisely for that reason the proof of the Absolute in Hegel has, in principle and 
essence, only a formal significance, notwithstanding the scientific rigor with which it 
is carried out. Right at its starting point, the philosophy of Hegel presents us with a 
contradiction, the contradiction between truth and science, between essence and form, 
between thinking and writing. The Absolute Idea is assumed, not formally, to be sure, 
but essentially. What Hegel premises as stages and constituent parts of mediation, he 
thinks are determined by the Absolute Idea. Hegel does not step outside the Idea, nor 
does he forget it. Rather, he already thinks the antithesis out of which the Idea should 
produce itself on the basis of its having been taken for granted. It is already proved 
substantially before it is proved formally. Hence, it must always remain unprovable, 
always subjective for someone who recognizes in the antithesis of the Idea a premise 
which the Idea has itself established in advance. The externalization of the Idea is, so 
to speak, only a dissembling; it is only a pretense and nothing serious – the Idea is just 
playing a game. The conclusive proof is the beginning of the Logic, whose beginning 
is to be taken as the beginning of philosophy as such. That the starting point is being 
is only a formalism, for being is here not the true starting point, nor the truly Primary. 
The starting point could just as well be the Absolute Idea because it was already a 
certainty, an immediate truth for Hegel before he wrote the Logic; i.e., before he gave 
a scientific form of expression to his logical ideas. The Absolute Idea – the Idea of the 
Absolute – is its own indubitable certainty as the Absolute Truth. It posits itself in 
advance as true; that which the Idea posits as the other, again presupposes the Idea 
according to its essence. In this way, the proof remains only a formal one. To Hegel, 
the thinker, the Absolute Idea was absolute certainty, but to Hegel, the author, it was a 
formal uncertainty. This contradiction between the thinker who is without needs, who 
can anticipate that which is yet to be presented because everything is already settled 
for him, and the needy writer who has to go through a chain of succession and who 
posits and objectifies as formally uncertain what is certain to the thinker – this 
contradiction is the process of the Absolute Idea which presupposes being and 
essence, but in such a way that these on their part already presuppose the Idea. This is 
the only adequate reason required to explain the contradiction between the actual 
starting point of the Logic and its real starting point which lies at the end. As was 
already pointed out, Hegel in his heart of hearts was convinced of the certainty of the 
Absolute Idea. In this regard, there was nothing of the critic or the skeptic in him. 
However, the Absolute Idea had to demonstrate its truth, had to be released from the 
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confines of a subjective intellectual conception – it had to be shown that it also 
existed for others. Thus understood, the question of its proof had an essential, and at 
the same time an inessential, meaning: It was a necessity in so far as the Absolute 
Idea had to prove itself, because only so could it demonstrate its necessity; but it was 
at the same time superfluous as far as the inner certainty of the truth of the Absolute 
Idea was concerned. The expression of this superfluous necessity, of this dispensable 
indispensability or indispensable dispensability is the Hegelian method. That is why 
its end is its beginning and its beginning its end. That is why being in it is already the 
certainty of the Idea, and nothing other than the Idea in its immediacy. That is why the 
Idea’s lack of self-knowledge in the beginning is, in the sense of the Idea, only an 
ironical lack of knowledge. What the Idea says is different from what it thinks. It says 
“being” or “essence,” ‘but actually it thinks only for itself. Only at the end does it also 
say what it thinks, but it also retracts at the end what it had expressed at the 
beginning, saying: “What you had, at the beginning and successively, taken to be a 
different entity, that I am myself.” The Idea itself is being and essence, but it does not 
yet confess to be so; it keeps this secret to itself.……… 
“Hegel restored philosophy by rescuing it from the realm of imagination. A Hegelian 
applies with perfect justification to Hegel what Aristotle remarked of Anaxagoras; 
namely, that he (Anaxagoras), as one among drunks, was the only sober thinker 
among the philosophers of nature. With Hegel the unity of thought and being acquired 
a rational meaning, which is not, however, above criticism. Hegel’s principle is the 
thinking spirit. He incorporated into philosophy the element in which rationalism has 
its being; namely, the intellect. In spite of the assurance to the contrary, the intellect, 
both as a matter of fact and with respect to its own reality, was excluded from the idea 
of the Absolute; in Hegel, it became a moment of the Absolute itself. The 
metaphysical expression of this state of affairs is the statement that the negative, the 
other or that which is an object of reflection, is to be conceived not only as negative 
and finite, but also as positive and essential. There is therefore a negative and critical 
element in Hegel even if what really determines his thinking is the idea of the 
Absolute. Although he recognized that the Absolute lacked intellect or the principle of 
form – both are to him one and the same – and although he actually defined the 
Absolute differently from Schelling by attributing to it the principle of form, thus 
raising form to the level of essence, the fact remains that for Hegel form – and this is 
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indeed necessarily included in its notion – simultaneously means something formal, 
and the intellect again means something negative. It was assumed that the content of 
the philosophy of the Absolute was true, speculative, and profound; all it lacked was 
the form of the notion. The notion – form or intellect – was posited as essential to the 
extent that its absence meant a defect. However, this defect must be only a formal 
affair if the content has been assumed as true – herein can be seen the proof of what 
we said earlier about the method of Hegel. This means that philosophy is not 
concerned with anything except notion or form. The content – even if it is to be 
produced internally by philosophy’s self-activity inasmuch as it is contained in the 
form of the notion – is always given: The business of philosophy is solely to 
apprehend it by critically distinguishing the essential from the non-essential or from 
that which is contributed by the peculiar form of intuition or sensuousness. 
Philosophy in Hegel has therefore no genetico-critical sense, although it certainly has 
a critical one. A genetico-critical philosophy is one that does not dogmatically 
demonstrate or apprehend an object given through perception – for what Hegel says 
applies unconditionally to objects given immediately, i.e., those that are absolutely 
real and given through nature – but examines its origin; which questions whether an 
object is a real object, only an idea, or just a psychological phenomenon; which, 
finally, distinguishes with utmost rigor between what is subjective and what is 
objective. The genetico-critical philosophy is mainly concerned with those things that 
are otherwise called secondary causes. Indeed, its relationship to absolute philosophy 
– which turns subjective psychological processes and speculative needs, for example, 
Jakob Böhme’s process through which God is mediated, into the processes of the 
Absolute – is, to illustrate by analogy, the same as the relationship of that theological 
view of nature which takes comets or other strange phenomena to be the immediate 
workings of God to the purely physicist or natural philosophical view which sees, for 
example, the cause of the gallnut in the innocent sting of an insect rather than looking 
upon it, as theology does, as a sign of the existence of the Devil as a personal being. 
The Hegelian philosophy is, uniquely, a rational mysticism. Hence it fascinates in the 
same measure as it repels. The mystical-speculative souls, for whom it is an 
unbearable contradiction to see the mystical united with the rational, find it repulsive 
because they find the notion disappointing, and destructive of the very mystical 
fascination they cherish. It is equally repulsive to rational heads who find the union of 
the rational and the mystical abhorrent. The unity of the subjective and the objective 
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as enunciated and placed at the summit of philosophy by Schelling, a unity that is still 
basic to Hegel although placed by him – but only according to form – in the right 
place; namely, at the end of philosophy as the Result. This unity is both a fruitless and 
a harmful principle because it eliminates the distinction between “subjective” and 
“objective” even in the case of particulars, and renders futile the genetico-critical 
thought, indeed, negates the very question about truth. The reason why Hegel 
conceived those ideas which express only subjective needs to be objective truth is 
because he did not go back to the source of and the need for these ideas. What he took 
for real reveals itself on closer examination to be of a highly dubious nature. He made 
what is secondary primary, thus either ignoring that which is really primary or 
dismissing it as something subordinate. And he demonstrated what is only particular, 
what is only relatively rational, to be the rational in and for itself. Thus, as a 
consequence of the lack of a genetico-critical mode of enquiry, we see nothingness – 
a conception that is extremely proximate to the idea of the Absolute – play its role 
right at the beginning of the Logic. But what is this nothingness? “By the shadow of 
Aristotle!” Nothingness is that which is absolutely devoid of thought and reason. 
Nothingness cannot be thought at all, because to think is to determine, as Hegel 
himself says. If nothingness were conceived, it would come to be determined, and 
hence it would no longer be nothingness. As has been rightly said, of the non-essent 
there is no knowledge. We call nothingness that to which no concept corresponds 
(Wolf). Thought can think only that which is because thought is itself an essent, a real 
activity. The pagan philosophers have been criticized for not being able to overcome 
the eternity of matter and the world. However, to them, matter meant being; it was the 
sensuous expression of being. What they have been criticized for is that they made 
use of thought. But have the Christians really done away with the eternity; that is, the 
reality of being? All they have done is to place it into a particular being, into the being 
of God which they thought of as its own ground and as being without beginning. 
Thought can never go beyond being, because it cannot go beyond itself; because 
reason consists only in positing being; because only this or that being, but not the 
genesis of being itself, can be thought. The activity of thinking authenticates itself as a 
well-grounded and real activity precisely through the fact that its first and last notion 
is that of being without beginning. The Augustinian nothingness, which appears to be 
so impressive and profound to speculative thinkers precisely because there is nothing 
behind it, is simply an expression of absolute arbitrariness and thoughtlessness. This 
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amounts to saying that I cannot conceive of any other ground of the world except 
absolute arbitrariness; that is, I cannot conceive of any other ground except no ground 
at all, except as just an empty act of will. But in a mere act of will reason disappears 
and I do not advance something which could be an object for thought, which could be 
called a ground; what I say is as much as nothing. Hence all I express is my own 
ignorance, my own arbitrariness. Nothingness is an absolute self-deception, proton 
pseudos, the absolute lie in itself. The thought of nothingness is thought contradicting 
itself. He who thinks nothingness thinks precisely nothing. Nothingness is the 
negation of thought; it can therefore only be thought at all in so far as it is made into 
something. In the moment nothingness is thought of, it is also not thought of, for I 
also think the opposite of nothingness. “Nothingness is simple sameness with itself.” 
Oh really? But are simplicity and sameness then not real determinations? Do I really 
think nothingness when I think simple sameness? Do I therefore not deny nothingness 
the moment I posit it? “Nothingness is complete vacuity, complete absence of 
determination and content, complete undifferentiatedness in itself.” What? Is 
nothingness undifferentiated in itself? Do I then not posit something in nothingness in 
exactly the same way in which nothingness in creatio ex nihilo is posited as quasi-
matter in so far as the world is supposed to be created out of nothingness? Can I then 
speak of nothingness without contradicting myself? Nothingness is complete vacuity. 
But what is vacuity? Vacuity is where there is nothing, but at the same time where 
there should be or can be something. In other words, vacuity is the expression for 
capacity. Now this would make nothingness into an entity, and an entity whose 
capacity to contain is the greatest. But you say that it is absolutely without 
determination and content. However, I cannot think of something that lacks all 
determination and content, for it is impossible to have a notion of something that 
lacks all determination. By using the word “lack,” I give expression to the fact that 
something is missing, that a default is involved. This means that I think of content and 
determination as primary because they are positive, or, in other words, I think 
nothingness through something which is not nothingness. I set nothingness in relation 
to that which is full of content. But this also means that where I set things in relation 
to one another I at the same time posit determinations. Thought is a determinate, i.e., 
an affirmative activity to such a degree that that which is absolutely indeterminate 
becomes something determinate the moment it is thought; that through the very act of 
thought the idea of nothingness reveals itself directly as thoughtlessness, as an untrue 
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thought, as something that just simply cannot be thought. If it were really possible to 
think nothingness, the distinction between reason and unreason, thought and 
thoughtlessness would disappear. In that case It would be possible to think and justify 
any and everything, even the greatest impossibility and nonsense. This also explains 
why the most senseless fantasies and the most preposterous miracle-mongering could 
flourish as long as the idea of a creatio ex nihilo was held to be true, for they naturally 
followed from the idea of nothingness which, as a sanctified authority, stood at the 
head of creation. Nothingness is the limit of reason. A follower of Kant would of 
course interpret this limit – as all other limits – in the sense of the limitation of reason. 
Nothingness, however, is a rational limit, a limit which reason itself imposes upon 
itself and which is an expression of its essence and reality because nothingness is 
simply the absence of all reason. If it were possible for reason to think nothingness, it 
would in that case have taken leave of itself.” (Feuerbach 1839 [1972]). 
And Engels proclaimed in Chapter 6  of The Holy Family:  
“….. who, then, revealed the mystery of the “system”? Feuerbach. Who annihilated 
the dialectics of concepts, the war of the gods that was known to the philosophers 
alone? Feuerbach. Who substituted for the old lumber and for “infinite self-
consciousness” if not, indeed, “the significance of man” – as though man had another 
significance than that of being man! – at any rate “Man”? Feuerbach, and only 
Feuerbach. And he did more. Long ago he did away with the very categories with 
which “Criticism” now operates – the “real wealth of human relations, the immense 
content of history, the struggle of history, the fight of the Mass against the Spirit”, 
etc., etc.” (Marx and Engels 1845 [1975]). 
However, Feuerbach loved to remain in the realm of abstraction only, far away from that of 
living reality. From the abstract man of Feuerbach, one meets real living men only when one 
considers them as participants in history; and precisely that was what Feuerbach resisted. 
“But the step which Feuerbach did not take nevertheless had to be taken. The cult of 
abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be 
replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further 
development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx 
in 1845 in The Holy Family.” (Engels 1886 [1970]). 
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Marx and Engels inherited the Hegelian-Feuerbach legacy from a radical critique and 
rearticulation. As Engels observed in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy (quoted in the last chapter), the materialism of the preceding century had 
predominantly been mechanical, because at that time, of all natural sciences, only mechanics 
of solid bodies had come to any definite close. The exclusive application of the standards of 
mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature had constituted the first specific but 
inevitable limitations of the classical French materialism. Its second limitation had been its 
inability to comprehend the universe as a process, as matter undergoing uninterrupted 
historical development. This had no doubt corresponded with the level of the natural science 
of that time, and with the metaphysical, that is, anti-dialectical manner of philosophizing 
connected with it and hence been quite inevitable. The ‘vulgar materialists’ of Germany in 
the 1850s too followed suit. They did not care to make use of the advances of natural science 
made in the meantime to develop the theory any further.  
“Feuerbach alone was of significance as a philosopher. But not only did philosophy – 
claimed to soar above all special sciences and to be the science of sciences connecting 
them – remain to him an impassable barrier, an inviolable holy thing, but as a 
philosopher, too, he stopped half-incapable of disposing of Hegel through criticism; 
he simply threw him aside as useless, while he himself, compared with the 
encyclopaedic wealth of the Hegelian system, achieved nothing positive beyond a 
turgid religion of love and a meagre, impotent morality.” (Engels 1886 [1970]). 
This was the background for Marx and Engels. They set out, “free from preconceived idealist 
crotchets”, with a materialistic world outlook, “taken really seriously for the first time” and 
carried through consistently “in all domains of knowledge concerned”. They did not abandon 
Hegel. 
“On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side …. from the dialectical 
method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, 
dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only 
exist – unknown where – from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole 
existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are 
treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself 
by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, 
it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of 
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himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude 
form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the 
Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development 
apparent in nature and history – that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive 
movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag 
movements and temporary retrogression – is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-
movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all 
events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to 
be done away with. We comprehended the concepts in our heads once more 
materialistically – as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things 
as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to 
the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human 
thought – two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their 
expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature 
and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves 
unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of 
seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the 
conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of 
Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and 
placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best 
working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only 
by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph 
Dietzgen.” (Engels 1886 [1970]). 
Joseph Dietzgen (1828 – 1888; German socialist philosopher and Marxist) was, according to 
himself, “not an academician, but a simple tanner who learned Philosophy by himself”. He 
developed the notion of dialectical materialism independently in The Nature of Human 
Brainwork (1869). He wrote in his 1876 work, Social-Democratic Philosophy: 
“The hope of Social-Democracy is based on the organic necessity of progress. We do 
not depend on the good will of any man. Our principle is organic, our philosophy 
materialistic, but our materialism is richer in essence and more positive than any of its 
predecessors. It absorbed the Idea, the antagonism of matter, it mastered the domain 
of Reason, and overcame the antagonism between the mechanical and spiritual view 
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of life. The spirit of negation is with us at the same time positive, our element is 
dialectical. “Once my work on Economics finished,” wrote Marx to me privately, “I 
shall write a Dialectics. The laws of Dialectics have been formulated by Hegel, 
though in mystical form. What we have to do has to strip it of that form.” Being afraid 
it might be long before Marx could undertake such a work, and having since my youth 
independently thought a good deal on that subject, I shall try to throw some light on 
dialectical philosophy. It is in my opinion the central sun from whom light goes forth 
to illuminate not only Political Economy, but the whole course of human 
development, and it will finally, I expect, penetrate to the “final cause” of all science.” 
(Dietzgen (1876 [1906]). 
“As far back as 1844 Frederick Engels spoke in the preface to his Condition of the 
Working Class in England of the end Feuerbach put to all philosophy. But Feuerbach 
was so intensely occupied with the theological devotee that he had very little time and 
mental energy left to join issue with the other sister, the philosophical one. His final 
solution of philosophy is more implicit than explicit. Yet this disciple of Hegel proves 
indirectly the truth of Marx’s word: “The true laws of Dialectics are to be found in 
Hegel, though only in a mystical form.” Feuerbach and Marx, both Hegelians, arrived 
at the same result by the same method which Feuerbach made use of in his analysis of 
religion, and Marx in his analysis of social economy.” (Dietzgen 1876 [1906]). 
Though his writings had a profound influence on Lenin, it is unfortunate that he has not 
received his due share of recognition in the Marxist circle. Lenin himself seems to have had 
very little esteem for him, as he wrote in his Materialism and Empirio-criticism:  
“Joseph Dietzgen is a dialectical materialist. We shall show below that his mode of 
expression is often inexact, that he is often not free from confusion, a fact which has 
been seized upon by various foolish people…” (Lenin 1908 [1947]). 
Despite a large number of quotes from Dietzgen in defence of dialectical materialism that 
Lenin used freely in this work, he also spoke of “a specific philosophy of Dietzgen differing 
from dialectical materialism”, “by seizing upon … incorrect passages” from him. (Lenin 
1908 [1947]). 
Anyhow, according to Engels, the revolutionary side of the Hegelian philosophy was thus 
again taken up, after Feuerbach, this time freed from the Hegelian idealist trimmings which 
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had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is a complex of 
processes, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a 
progressive development asserts itself in the end,  
“has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary 
consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.” (Engels 
1886 [1970]). 
This glorious success of the new philosophy, dialectical materialism, was made possible by 
the developments in natural science. The old metaphysics, which had accepted things as 
finished objects, had arisen from a natural science looking into the dead and living things as 
finished objects. 
“…. in fact, while natural science up to the end of the last century was predominantly 
a collecting science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a 
systematizing science, a science of the processes, of the origin and development of 
these things and of the interconnection which binds all these natural processes into 
one great whole. Physiology, which investigates the processes occurring in plant and 
animal organisms; embryology, which deals with the development of individual 
organisms from germs to maturity; geology, which investigates the gradual formation 
of the Earth’s surface – all these are the offspring of our century. 
“But, above all, there are three great discoveries which have enabled our knowledge 
of the interconnection of natural processes to advance by leaps and bounds: 
“First, the discovery of the cell as the unit from whose multiplication and 
differentiation the whole plant and animal body develops. Not only is the 
development and growth of all higher organisms recognized to proceed according to a 
single general law, but the capacity of the cell to change indicates the way by which 
organisms can change their species and thus go through a more than individual 
development. 
“Second, the transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-
called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature – mechanical force and 
its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), 
electricity, magnetism, and chemical energy – are different forms of manifestation of 
universal motion, which pass into one another in definite proportions so that in place 
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of a certain quantity of the one which disappears, a certain quantity of another makes 
its appearance and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced to this incessant process 
of transformation from one form into another. 
“Finally, the proof which Darwin first developed in connected form that the stock of 
organic products of nature environing us today, including man, is the result of a long 
process of evolution from a few originally unicellular germs, and that these again 
have arisen from protoplasm or albumen, which came into existence by chemical 
means. 
“Thanks to these three great discoveries, and the other immense advances in natural 
science, we have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the 
interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also 
the interconnection of these particular spheres on the whole, and so can present in an 
approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the interconnection in nature 
by means of the facts provided by an empirical science itself.” (Engels 1886 [1970]). 
And that is what Marx did in social sciences.  He opposed the static mode of thought in 
metaphysics which assumed fixed (dualistic) divisions, and which attributed to things a fixed 
being, instead of comprehending them in movement and transition, in conflicts and 
contradictions and interconnections and interactions. In a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, he 
wrote on 6 March 1868: 
“He [Mr Dühring] knows full well that my method of exposition is not Hegelian, 
since I am a materialist, and Hegel an idealist. Hegel’s dialectic is the basic form of 
all dialectic, but only after being stripped of its mystical form, and it is precisely this 
which distinguishes my method.” (Marx 1868[1987]).  
Again he wrote in his ‘Afterword’ to the second edition of Capital (Volume 1):  
“My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct 
opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, 
which, under the name of “the Idea”, he even transforms into an independent subject, 
is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal 
form of “the Idea”. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the 
material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.  
40 
 
“The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a 
time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of 
“Das Kapital”, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi, 
who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in the same way as the brave 
Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I 
therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and 
there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression 
peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no 
means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be 
turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the 
mystical shell.” (Marx 1873 [1954]). 
Marx found a contradiction in the social reception of the Hegelian dialectics, as it became a 
‘fashion in Germany’ and at the same time ‘a scandal and an abomination’, because of its 
subversive implications in its affirmative recognition of the negation of the existing state of 
things: 
“In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to 
transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal 
and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in 
its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the 
same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking 
up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, 
and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary 
existence; because it lets nothing imposed upon it, and is in its essence critical and 
revolutionary.” (ibid.) 
Significantly, history was to witness later on the same dialectics becoming ‘a scandal and an 
abomination’ to the existing state of socialism! 
Since his scientific dialectics was different from the Hegelian, Marx wanted to make it clear 
to the common man through an account in his own words, just as he explained though briefly 
the absolute method of the Hegelian dialectics in simple terms in The Poverty of Philosophy 
of 1847 (quoted above). In a letter to Engels (London) on 16 January 1858, he wrote: 
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“What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel’s Logic at 
which I had taken another look by mere accident, Freiligrath having found and made 
me a present of several volumes of Hegel, originally the property of Bakunin. If ever 
the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 
or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method 
which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified.” Marx (1858 [1983]). 
But that time never came. After ten years he wrote the same to Joseph Dietzgen  on 9 May 
1868 (which we have seen earlier in Dietzgen’s statement in his 1876 work): 
“When I have cast off the burden of political economy, I shall write a “Dialectic”. The 
true laws of dialectics are already contained in Hegel, though in a mystified form.” 
Marx (1868 [1988]). 
But the time never let him cast off that burden, and thus, as Karl Korsch in his Introduction to 
“Capital” remarked, there remained “an enormous gap between what Marx planned and what 
he actually carried out in his work.” (Korsch 1932). A number of texts criticising Hegel are 
there scattered in his works, especially in the earlier ones (for example, Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ of 1843-44, the 1844 Manuscripts, The Holy 
Family of 1844-45, the Introduction of 1859 Grundrisse, Theses on Feuerbach,  The German 
Ideology, the Afterword), but mostly in terms of some metaphors (such as “standing on 
head”, “turning right side up”, “discovering the rational kernel within the mystical shell”), 
which are ambiguous and misleading in the absence of a ‘background paper’, a proper 
exposition of his philosophical method. Korsch (1932) points out a few 
 “really grave difficulties raised by certain parts of Marx’s work …. – difficulties 
experienced not only by the untutored, but also by those who are at home in the 
subject, but are not philosophically trained. It is these difficulties that are chiefly 
responsible for the oft-reiterated complaint about the ‘obscurity of Capital’. The 
passages in question are, above all, the third section of the first chapter on the ‘Form 
of Value’, …. and one or two passages closely connected with it in Chapter 3, dealing 
with ‘Money’. Then there are a few other, rather less difficult parts, among them 
Chapters 9, 11 and 12, …. considered now in their proper relation to Chapters 16 to 
18 on ‘Absolute and Relative Surplus Value’, which are often regarded superficially 
as a simple recapitulation of Chapters 9, 11, and 12. All these difficulties are 
integrally bound up with what is called the ‘dialectical method’.” 
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But the difficulties did come to the notice of Marx himself! He happily remarked in the 
‘Afterword’ to the second edition of Capital (Volume 1):  
“That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood is shown by 
the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.” 
(Marx 1873 [1954]. Emphasis added.) 
And he contentedly showcased a couple of examples: 
“Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat 
economics metaphysically, and on the other hand –  imagine! – confine myself to the 
mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts (Comtist ones?) for 
the cook-shops of the future. In answer to the reproach in re metaphysics, Professor 
Sieber has it: 
“In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive 
method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are 
common to the best theoretic economists.”  
“M. Block – “Les Théoriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des 
Economistes, Juillet et Août 1872” – makes the discovery that my method is analytic 
and says: “Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus 
eminents.” German reviews, of course, shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The 
European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the 
method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of 
inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-
dialectical. It says: 
“At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the 
presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, 
always in the German, i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is 
infinitely more realistic than all his forerunners in the work of economic 
criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.” (Marx 1873 [1954]) 
And he continued in the most self-gratifying tone to provide an answer, but with another 
show off: 
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“I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, 
which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible. 
“After a quotation from the preface to my “Criticism of Political Economy,” Berlin, 
1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer 
goes on:  
“The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the 
phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law 
of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a 
definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still 
greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., 
of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions 
into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the 
effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only 
troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the 
necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to 
establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental 
starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both 
the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order 
into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether 
men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of 
it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed 
by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, 
but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and 
intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a 
part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-
matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form 
of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the 
material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry 
will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with 
ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that 
both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually 
form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but 
most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the 
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sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an 
evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic 
life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or 
the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do 
not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its 
own. ... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is 
passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to 
other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the 
history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists 
misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the 
laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows 
that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or 
animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws 
in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the 
variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those 
organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same 
at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of 
development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of 
development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing 
them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining 
from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of 
capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that 
every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value 
of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the 
origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its 
replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of 
fact, Marx’s book has.”  
“Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking 
and (as far as concerns my own application of it) generous way, what else is he 
picturing but the dialectic method? (Marx 1873 [1954]. Emphasis added.) 
That the method employed in Das Kapital had been little understood did not however prompt 
Marx to reconsider his old pledge of writing 2 or 3 sheets on ‘Dialectics’: 
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 “The explanation Marx himself gave (in the Afterword to the second German 
Edition) of the importance of this method for the structure and exposition of Capital, 
has often been misconstrued – whether honestly or not – to mean simply that in the 
formulation of his work, and in particular of the chapter on the theory of value, Marx 
flirted here and there with the peculiar mode of expression of the Hegelian dialectic. 
When we look closer however, we recognise that even the explanation given by Marx 
himself goes much further than that. It implies in fact that he fully espoused the 
rational kernel (if not the mystical shell) of the dialectical method. For all the 
empirical stringency which Marx, as a scientific investigator brought to his 
observation of the concrete reality of socio-economic and historical facts, the reader 
who lacks a strict philosophical training will still find the very simple concepts of 
commodity, value, and form of value, rather schematic, abstract, and unreal at first 
sight. Yet these concepts are supposed to anticipate entirely, to contain within 
themselves, like a germ as yet undeveloped, the concrete reality of the whole process 
of being and becoming, genesis, development, and decline of the present-day mode of 
production and social order – and the concepts do indeed anticipate these realities. It 
is only that the connection is obscure or even invisible to the common eye. But the 
one who is aware of the connection, the author himself, the ‘demiurge’ who has re-
created reality in the form of these concepts, refuses to betray the secret of his 
knowledge at the outset.” (Korsch (1932; emphasis added). 
And no wonder there remained blanks of ambiguities that the later imaginative exercises 
sought to fill in many divisive ways. Moreover, Marx appears to have been in jest when he 
wrote in the ‘Afterword’  (as quoted earlier): “I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of 
that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted 
with the modes of expression peculiar to him.” (emphasis added). His use of the term 
‘coquetted with’ implies only a superficial attachment and ‘modes of expression’, a sharp 
contrast in substance. However, it goes without saying that nobody would believe Marx only 
toyed with Hegelian terminology. In fact, his philosophical method was saturated with the 
spirit of Hegelian dialectics, which unfortunately he ‘refused to betray at the outset’ of his 
analytical works, leading to unintentional chaos. Brilliantly and meticulously did he analyze 
the process of development and functioning of capitalism in his magnum opus in the 
framework of this philosophical method. Passages are aplenty that exemplify all the three 
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laws of dialectics such as i) unity of the opposites, ii) transformation of quantity into quality, 
and iii) negation of the negation.1 
Marx identified “antagonistic forms of commodities” and unity of opposites (“unities of use-
value and value”) in commodity production and exchange (Marx 1873 [1954]); he saw the 
metamorphosis of commodity in terms of a sale (commodity – money) and a purchase 
(money – commodity):  
“To say that these two independent and antithetical acts have an intrinsic unity, are 
essentially one, is the same as to say that this intrinsic oneness expresses itself in an 
external antithesis. …. The antithesis, use-value and value; the contradictions that 
private labour is bound to manifest itself as direct social labour, that a particularised 
concrete kind of labour has to pass for abstract human labour; the contradiction 
between the personification of objects and the representation of persons by things; all 
these antitheses and contradictions, which are immanent in commodities, assert 
themselves, and develop their modes of motion, in the antithetical phases of the 
metamorphosis of a commodity.” (Marx 1873 [1954]) 
He saw these contradictions as the driving force of capitalist development with the hallmark 
that  
“each single transaction invariably conforms to the laws of the exchange of 
commodities, the capitalist buying labour-power, the labourer selling it, and we will 
assume at its real value; in so far as all this is true, it is evident that the laws of 
appropriation or of private property, laws that are based on the production and 
circulation of commodities, become by their own inner and inexorable dialectic 
changed into their very opposite.” (Marx 1873 [1954]) 
In this powerful dialectical light, he was able to find that 
“property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the 
unpaid labour of others or its product, and to be the impossibility, on the part of the 
labourer, of appropriating his own product. The separation of property from labour 
has become the necessary consequence of a law that apparently originated in their 
identity.” (ibid.) 
                                                          
1
 We will discuss these in detail later on in the section on Engels.  
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The law of transformation of quantity into quality appears in Chapter 11 of Capital, Volume 
I; while discussing the rate and mass of surplus value, Marx outlined “the transformation of 
the master of a trade into a capitalist”: 
“A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to 
devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e., as 
personified capital, to the appropriation and therefore control of the labour of others, 
and to the selling of the products of this labour. The guilds of the middle ages 
therefore tried to prevent by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a 
capitalist, by limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master 
within a very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns 
into a capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production 
greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is 
shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his “Logic”), that merely 
quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative changes.” (Marx 
1873 [1954]) 
Marx added the following to the third edition of Capital: “The molecular theory of modern 
chemistry first scientifically worked out by Laurent and Gerhardt rests on no other law.”2  
And finally, the law of the negation of the negation appears in the powerful presentation of 
Chapter 32 on ‘Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation’: 
“What does the primitive accumulation of capital, i.e., its historical genesis, resolve 
itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage 
labourers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the 
immediate producers, i.e., the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its 
owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only 
where the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private 
individuals. But according as these private individuals are labourers or not labourers, 
private property has a different character. The numberless shades, that it at first sight 
presents, correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The 
private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty 
                                                          
2
 This now appears as a footnote with a brief explanation by Engels meant for nonchemists; 
Marx also wrote to Engels about this on 22 June 1867. 
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industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an 
essential condition for the development of social production and of the free 
individuality of the labourer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists 
also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets 
loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer 
is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself: the peasant 
of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. 
This mode of production presupposes parcelling of the soil and scattering of the other 
means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, 
so also it excludes cooperation, division of labour within each separate process of 
production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of Nature by 
society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible 
only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or 
less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, “to decree 
universal mediocrity”.  At a certain stage of development, it brings forth the material 
agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions 
spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organization fetters them and 
keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the 
transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially 
concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the 
few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of 
subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful expropriation of 
the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series 
of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been 
epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation 
of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under 
the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most 
meanly odious. Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing 
together of the isolated, independent labouring individual with the conditions of his 
labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of 
the nominally free labour of others, i.e., on wage labour.3 
                                                          
3
 “Nous sommes dans une condition tout-à-fait nouvelle de la societé... nous tendons a 
séparer toute espèce de propriété d’avec toute espèce de travail.” [“We are in a situation 
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“As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old 
society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their 
means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its 
own feet, then the further socialization of labour and further transformation of the 
land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common 
means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes 
a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working 
for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is 
accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by 
the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this 
centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-
extending scale, the cooperative form of the labour process, the conscious technical 
application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the 
instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the 
economizing of all means of production by their use as means of production of 
combined, socialized labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world 
market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with 
the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and 
monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of 
misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the 
revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, 
united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. 
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has 
sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of 
production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become 
incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The 
knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.  
“The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, 
produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private 
property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which is entirely new for society ... we are striving to separate every kind of property from 
every kind of labour.”] (Sismondi: “Nouveaux Principes d’Econ. Polit.” t.II, p.434.) 
[Footnote as in the original.] 
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with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of 
negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him 
individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on cooperation 
and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.  
“The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into 
capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, 
violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already 
practically resting on socialized production, into socialized property. In the former 
case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the 
latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.”4 (Marx 
1887 [1954]). 
One of the most ardent appreciations of this analysis came later on from Rosa Luxemburg 
(1871 – 1919), who wrote in her magnum opus,  The Accumulation of Capital: 
“Marx had to establish a dynamic distinction in the course of history between the 
commodity producer and the labouring man, in order to distinguish the twin aspects of 
labour which appear static in bourgeois economy. He had to discover that the 
production of commodities is a definite historical form of social production before he 
could decipher the hieroglyphics of capitalist economy. In a word, Marx had to 
approach the problem with methods of deduction diametrically opposed to those of 
the classical school, he had in his approach to renounce the latter’s faith in the human 
                                                          
4
 The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the 
isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to 
association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very 
foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the 
bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory 
of the proletariat are equally inevitable.... Of all the classes that stand face-to-face with the 
bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes 
perish and disappear in the face of Modern Industry, the proletariat is its special and essential 
product.... The lower middle classes, the small manufacturers, the shopkeepers, the artisan, 
the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as 
fractions of the middle class... they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of 
history. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei,” London, 
1848, pp. 9, 11. [Footnote as in the original.] 
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and normal element in bourgeois production and to recognise their historical 
transience: he had to reverse the metaphysical deductions of the classics into their 
opposite, the dialectical.” (Luxemburg 1913). 
“….. the keen dialectics of scientific analysis were required to reveal how the right of 
ownership changes in the course of accumulation into appropriation of other people’s 
property, how commodity exchange turns into exploitation and equality becomes 
class-rule.” (Luxemburg 1913). 
However, for Marx’s contemporary Eugen Karl Dühring (1833–1921),  
“… this mysterious dialectical rubbish will tempt no one who has even a modicum of 
sound judgment left to have anything to do ... with these deformities of thought and 
style. With the demise of the last relics of the dialectical follies this means of duping 
... will lose its deceptive influence, and no one will any longer believe that he has to 
torture himself in order to get behind some profound piece of wisdom where the 
husked kernel of the abstruse things reveals at best the features of ordinary theories if 
not of absolute commonplaces... It is quite impossible to reproduce the” (Marxian) 
“maze in accordance with the Logos doctrine without prostituting sound logic.” 
(Quoted in Engels 1878 [1947]). 
It now behoved Engels to respond to this tirade in his Anti- Dühring (1878) and he quoted 
Dühring as “giving us at least two examples of the unsound Marxian Logos doctrine”; one on 
the law of transformation of quantity into quality with which Marx outlined “the 
transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist”, and the other on the law of the 
negation of the negation, the law by which “the expropriators are expropriated”. On the 
former, Dühring had written: 
“How comical is the reference to the confused, hazy Hegelian notion that quantity 
changes into quality, and that therefore an advance, when it reaches a certain size, 
becomes capital by this quantitative increase alone.” (Quoted in Engels 1878 [1947]). 
And on the latter: 
“This historical sketch” (of the genesis of the so-called primitive accumulation of 
capital in England) “is relatively the best part of Marx's book, and would be even 
better if it had not relied on the dialectical crutch to help out its scholarly crutch. The 
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Hegelian negation of the negation, in default of anything better and clearer, has in fact 
to serve here as the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the past. The 
abolition of ‘individual property’, which since the sixteenth century has been effected 
in the way indicated above, is the first negation. It will be followed by a second, 
which bears the character of a negation of the negation and hence of a restoration of 
‘individual property’, but in a higher form, based on the common ownership of land 
and of the instruments of labour. Herr Marx calls this new ‘individual property’ also 
‘social property’, and in this there appears the Hegelian higher unity, in which the 
contradiction is supposed to be sublated, that is to say, in the Hegelian verbal 
jugglery, both overcome and preserved... According to this, the expropriation of the 
expropriators is, as it were, the automatic result of historical reality in its materially 
external relations... It would be difficult to convince a sensible man of the necessity of 
the common ownership of land and capital, on the basis of credence in Hegelian word 
juggling such as the negation of the negation .... The nebulous hybrids of Marx’s 
conceptions will not however appear strange to anyone who realises what nonsense 
can be concocted with Hegelian dialectics as the scientific basis, or rather what 
nonsense must necessarily spring from it. For the benefit of the reader who is not 
familiar with these artifices, it must be pointed out expressly that Hegel’s first 
negation is the catechismal idea of the fall from grace and his second is that of a 
higher unity leading to redemption. The logic of facts can hardly be based on this 
nonsensical analogy borrowed from the religious sphere ..... Herr Marx remains 
cheerfully in the nebulous world of his property which is at once both individual and 
social and leaves it to his adepts to solve for themselves this profound dialectical 
enigma.” (Quoted in Engels 1878 [1947]). 
Engels now characterised  
“Herr Dühring’s total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics… by the very 
fact that he regards it as a mere proof-producing instrument, as a limited mind might 
look upon formal logic or elementary mathematics. …….To attempt to prove 
anything by means of dialectics alone to a crass metaphysician like Herr Dühring 
would be as much a waste of time as was the attempt made by Leibniz and his pupils 
to prove the principles of the infinitesimal calculus to the mathematicians of their 
time.” (Engels 1878 [1947]). 
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And he sought to explain and salvage the Marxian position: 
“…. by characterising the process as the negation of the negation, Marx does not 
intend to prove that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: only after 
he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and 
partially must occur in the future, he in addition characterises it as a process which 
develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law. That is all. It is therefore once 
again a pure distortion of the facts by Herr Dühring when he declares that the 
negation of the negation has to serve here as the midwife to deliver the future from the 
womb of the past, or that Marx wants anyone to be convinced of the necessity of the 
common ownership of land and capital (which is itself a Dühringian contradiction in 
corporeal form) on the basis of credence in the negation of the negation.” (Engels 
1878 [1947]). 
It was Dühring’s attack that posed for the first time the question of the function and status of 
dialectics in Marxism and prompted Engels to seek to defend their scientific method. This 
required him to prepare himself to be armed with scientific knowledge before mounting a 
counter-attack. He sketched out the background of Anti- Dühring in his ‘Preface’ to its 
second edition (1885): 
“Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from 
German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and 
history. But a knowledge of mathematics and natural science is essential to a 
conception of nature which is dialectical and at the same time materialist. Marx was 
well versed in mathematics, but we could keep up with natural science only 
piecemeal, intermittently and sporadically. For this reason, when I retired from 
business and transferred my home to London, thus enabling myself to give the 
necessary time to it, I went through as complete as possible a “moulting”, as Liebig 
calls it, in mathematics and the natural sciences, and spent the best part of eight years 
on it. I was right in the middle of this “moulting” process when it happened that I had 
to occupy myself with Herr Dühring’s so-called natural philosophy.” (Engels 1885 
[1947]). 
Dialectics of Nature was the culmination in 1886 of this profound scientific ‘moulting’. He 
was however able to provide detailed scientific discussion on dialectics, its brief historical 
development and its distinction in Marxism, while dissecting Dühring’s  philosophy itself. 
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Thus he wrote in his 1878 ‘Old Preface to Anti-Dühring: On Dialectics’ that appeared later 
on as part of his Dialectics of Nature that Aristotle and Hegel had been the only two thinkers 
who had fairly closely investigated dialectics. In Greek philosophy, dialectical thought had 
appeared in its pristine simplicity. The Greeks had viewed nature as a whole, in general, just 
because they had not yet been advanced enough to dissect, analyse nature. The universal 
connection of natural phenomena had not been proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks, it 
had been the result of direct contemplation. Herein Engels identified the inadequacy of Greek 
philosophy, on account of which it had yielded later to other modes of outlook on the world. 
The Hegelian dialectics, on the other hand, had developed from an utterly erroneous idealist 
point of departure. 
“It is the merit of Marx that, in contrast to the “peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi 
who now talk large in Germany”, he was the first to have brought to the fore again the 
forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its 
distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital 
to the facts of an empirical science, political economy. And he did it so successfully 
that even in Germany the newer economic school rises above the vulgar free-trade 
system only by copying from Marx (often enough incorrectly), on pretence of 
criticising him.” (Engels 1878 [1954]). 
Engels then went on to consider some instances of development of theories in natural science, 
“in which the real relation is stood on its head, the reflection is taken for the original form, 
and which consequently need to be turned right side up again”, in reminiscence of the 
Marxian ‘inversion’ of the Hegelian dialectics.  
“When for almost two centuries heat was considered a special mysterious substance 
instead of a form of motion of ordinary  matter, that was precisely such a case and the 
mechanical theory of heat carried out the inverting. Nevertheless physics dominated 
by the caloric theory discovered a series of highly important laws of heat and cleared 
the way, particularly through Fourier and Sadi Carnot, for the correct conception, 
which now for its part had to put right side up the laws discovered by its predecessor, 
to translate them into its own language. (Carnot’s function C literally inverted: 1/C = 
absolute temperature. Without this inversion nothing can be done with it.) Similarly, 
in chemistry the phlogistic theory first supplied the material, by a hundred years of 
experimental work, with the aid of which Lavoisier was able to discover in the 
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oxygen obtained by Priestley the real antipode of the fantastic phlogiston and thus 
could throw overboard the entire phlogistic theory. But this did not in the least do 
away with the experimental results of phlogistics. On the contrary, they persisted, 
only their formulation was inverted, was translated from the phlogistic into the now 
valid chemical language and thus they retained their validity. 
“The relation of Hegelian dialectics to rational dialectics is the same as that of the 
caloric theory to the mechanical theory of heat and that of the phlogistic theory to the 
theory of Lavoisier.” (Engels 1878 [1954]). 
Thus started Engels’ uncontrolled fascination for leaning on convenient instances that came 
in handy from natural science. The concluding line above speaks volumes for that. What he 
wrote in the ‘Introduction (General)’ of Anti-Dühring (Engels 1878 [1947]) again 
reverberated in his 1880 Socialism, Utopian and Scientific:   
“Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has 
furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown 
that, in the last resort, Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she 
does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes 
through a real historical evolution. In this connection, Darwin must be named before 
all others. He dealt the metaphysical conception of Nature the heaviest blow by his 
proof that all organic beings, plants, animals, and man himself, are the products of a 
process of evolution going on through millions of years. But, the naturalists, who have 
learned to think dialectically, are few and far between, and this conflict of the results 
of discovery with preconceived modes of thinking, explains the endless confusion 
now reigning in theoretical natural science, the despair of teachers as well as learners, 
of authors and readers alike. 
“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of 
mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore 
only be obtained by the methods of dialectics with its constant regard to the 
innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive 
changes. And in this spirit, the new German philosophy has worked. Kant began his 
career by resolving the stable Solar system of Newton and its eternal duration, after 
the famous initial impulse had once been given, into the result of a historical process, 
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the formation of the Sun and all the planets out of a rotating, nebulous mass. From 
this, he at the same time drew the conclusion that, given this origin of the Solar 
system, its future death followed of necessity. His theory, half a century later, was 
established mathematically by Laplace, and half a century after that, the spectroscope 
proved the existence in space of such incandescent masses of gas in various stages of 
condensation….. 
 “…. Modern materialism embraces the more recent discoveries of natural science, 
according to which Nature also has its history in time, the celestial bodies, like the 
organic species that, under favourable conditions, people them, being born and 
perishing. And even if Nature, as a whole, must still be said to move in recurrent 
cycles, these cycles assume infinitely larger dimensions. In both aspects, modern 
materialism is essentially dialectic, and no longer requires the assistance of that sort of 
philosophy which, queen-like, pretended to rule the remaining mob of sciences. As 
soon as each special science is bound to make clear its position in the great totality of 
things and of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is 
superfluous or unnecessary. That which still survives of all earlier philosophy is the 
science of thought and its law – formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is 
subsumed in the positive science of Nature and history.” (Engels 1880 [1970]). 
And finally this fascination fructified in his Dialectics of Nature, designed to integrate 
historical materialism into the philosophy of nature, to show that Marxism was based on 
certain laws of nature such that a single ontology covered both nature and humanity. 
Dialectical laws were now taken as the sole analytical tools to look into natural and social 
processes alike. Engels made full use of the erstwhile development of scientific theories and 
findings and brilliantly fitted them in with dialectical laws. An apt example here is his famous 
pamphlet The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man, included in 
Dialectics of Nature, in which he argued that human hand and brain grew together – an idea 
supported by later fossil discoveries: 
“… when their mode of life involved locomotion on level ground, the apes gradually 
got out of the habit of using their hands in walking and adopted a more and more erect 
posture. This was the decisive step in the transition from ape to man…. 
“The first operations for which our ancestors gradually learned to adapt their hands 
during the many thousands of years of transition from ape to man could have been 
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only very simple ones. …. Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by 
human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the 
historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been 
taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; 
the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to 
generation…. 
“First labour, after it and then with it speech – these were the two most essential 
stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that 
of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in hand with 
the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments 
– the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is inevitably accompanied by 
a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain 
as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of all the senses.” (Engels 1886 [1954]) 
However, it should be noted that Engels was apologetic in a general way in the ‘Preface’ to 
the second edition of Anti-Dühring for possible inadequacies in his knowledge of theoretical 
natural science, although he retracted nothing. While explaining the background of his 
‘moulting’ in natural science during his retired life in London and his encounter with Herr 
Dühring’s philosophy, he continued: 
“It was ….  only too natural that in dealing with this subject I was sometimes unable 
to find the correct technical expression, and in general moved with considerable 
clumsiness in the field of theoretical natural science. On the other hand, my lack of 
assurance in this field, which I had not yet overcome, made me cautious, and I cannot 
be charged with real blunders in relation to the facts known at that time or with 
incorrect presentation of recognised theories.” (Engels 1885 [1947]). 
Note that Engels’ exposition of dialectics started with a critique (in Ludwig Feuerbach and 
the End of Classical German Philosophy, 1886) of Hegel’s principle of the identity of 
thinking and being; as we have seen and quoted above, he sought, like Marx, to do away with 
this “ideological perversion”, because we comprehend “the concepts in our heads 
materialistically – as images of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or 
that stage of the absolute concept”. This ‘inversion’ of Hegel was important for Engels, as he 
maintained nature as primary and spirit as a product of matter. This also meant that the ontic 
priority Hegel accorded to the Idea be replaced by the temporal priority of matter. Thus it was 
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only “the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy”, “freed from the idealist trimmings”, 
that was taken up by Marxism, which asserted that: 
“The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of 
readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently 
stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an 
uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all 
seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development 
asserts itself in the end –  this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time 
of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is 
now scarcely ever contradicted.” (Engels 1886 [1970]). 
Thus (as quoted earlier), dialectics was reduced “to the science of the general laws of motion, 
both of the external world and of human thought”; the relationship of identity between the 
objective and subjective (in Hegel) was reduced to a dialectical unity between the two. What 
was new in this formulation, beyond this fact, was that dialectics was now extended to nature; 
nature and man were posited in a relationship of dialectical unity, mediated through praxis or 
activity. Thus Engels stated in the ‘Preface’ to the second edition of Anti-Dühring: 
“It goes without saying that my recapitulation of mathematics and the natural sciences 
was undertaken in order to convince myself also in detail – of what in general I was 
not in doubt – that in nature, amid the welter of innumerable changes, the same 
dialectical laws of motion force their way through as those which in history govern 
the apparent fortuitousness of events; the same laws which similarly form the thread 
running through the history of the development of human thought and gradually rise 
to consciousness in thinking man; the laws which Hegel first developed in all-
embracing but mystic form, and which we made it one of our aims to strip of this 
mystic form and to bring clearly before the mind in their complete simplicity and 
universality. It goes without saying that the old philosophy of nature – in spite of its 
real value and the many fruitful seeds it contained – was unable to satisfy us. As is 
more fully brought out in this book, natural philosophy, particularly in the Hegelian 
form, erred because it did not concede to nature any development in time, any 
“succession”, but only “co-existence”. This was on the one hand grounded in the 
Hegelian system itself, which ascribed historical evolution only to the “spirit”, but on 
the other hand was also due to the whole state of the natural sciences in that period. In 
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this Hegel fell far behind Kant, whose nebular theory had already indicated the origin 
of the solar system, and whose discovery of the retardation of the earth’s rotation by 
the tides also had proclaimed the doom of that system. And finally, to me there could 
be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them 
in it and evolving them from it.” (Engels 1885 [1947; emphasis added]). 
His discovery that “Nature is the proof of dialectics, and …. modern science has …. shown 
that …. Nature works dialectically” led him to three “most general laws”: the law of the 
transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; the law of the interpenetration of 
opposites; and the law of the negation of the negation. He credited all the three to Hegel, who 
had developed them “in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought ….. 
“The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws 
of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and 
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in 
accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite 
stage of evolution of human thought. If we turn the thing round, then everything 
becomes simple, and the dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in idealist 
philosophy at once become simple and clear as noonday.” (Engels 1886 [1954]). 
In Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 in Part I (‘Philosophy’) of Anti-Dühring, Engels endeavored to 
exposit and defend the extension of dialectics to nature. According to him, “we do not run up 
against any contradictions” in nature “so long as we consider things as at rest and lifeless”; 
but “as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal 
influence on one another”, then  
“we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: 
even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being 
at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in 
one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and 
simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.” (Engels 1878 
[1947]) 
It is interesting to compare this passage with one in Hegel’s Science of Logic; that Engels was 
blindly following Hegel cannot escape one’s scrutiny here: 
60 
 
“Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but 
because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at 
once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that 
they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but 
on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself.” (Hegel 1812 [1969]). 
Hegel was repeating from Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, despite Aristotle’s critical solutions; 
in his Physics, Aristotle had criticized Zeno’s reasoning as fallacious: 
“Zeno’s arguments about motion, which cause so much disquietude to those who try 
to solve the problems that they present, are four in number. The first asserts the non-
existence of motion on the ground that that which is in locomotion must arrive at the 
half-way stage before it arrives at the goal.... 
“The second is the so-called ‘Achilles’, and it amounts to this, that in a race the 
quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pursuer must first reach the 
point whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead. This 
argument is the same in principle as that which depends on bisection, though it differs 
from it in that the spaces with which we successively have to deal are not divided into 
halves. The result of the argument is that the slower is not overtaken: but it proceeds 
along the same lines as the bisection-argument (for in both a division of the space in a 
certain way leads to the result that the goal is not reached, though the ‘Achilles’ goes 
further in that it affirms that even the quickest runner in legendary tradition must fail 
in his pursuit of the slowest), so that the solution must be the same. And the axiom 
that that which holds a lead is never overtaken is false: it is not overtaken, it is true, 
while it holds a lead: but it is overtaken nevertheless if it is granted that it traverses 
the finite distance prescribed. These then are two of his arguments.  
“The third is that …. if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if 
that which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment, the 
flying arrow is therefore motionless. This is false, for time is not composed of 
indivisible moments any more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles. 
“The fourth argument is that concerning the two rows of bodies, each row being 
composed of an equal number of bodies of equal size, passing each other on a race-
course as they proceed with equal velocity in opposite directions, the one row 
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originally occupying the space between the goal and the middle point of the course 
and the other that between the middle point and the starting-post. This, he thinks, 
involves the conclusion that half a given time is equal to double that time. The fallacy 
of the reasoning lies in the assumption that a body occupies an equal time in passing 
with equal velocity a body that is in motion and a body of equal size that is at rest; 
which is false.” (Aristotle 350 BC [1994]: paragraph positions are slightly altered.) 
Hegel in the above passage accepted Zeno’s argument that motion is contradictory, but unlike 
Zeno (who had argued that motion is contradictory and hence an illusion), concluded that  
“motion is existent contradiction itself”. It is difficult to infer what Hegel actually meant here 
and the blanks of ambiguity have led to diverse interpretations. As Acton maintains: 
“If he intended to argue that contradictory propositions could both be true, that ‘both 
p and not-p’, then he was wrong and so was Engels in following him. For it can be 
proved that from any pair of contradictory propositions any conclusion we like can be 
deduced and hence that if contradictories are true, anything can be true. In this logical 
sense the term contradiction has its appropriate use in thought or discourse, as 
Dühring had argued. In saying that something both is and is not in the same place at 
the same time, that it is true both that it is in p at time t and that it is not in p at time t, 
the whole negating force of the word not is lost. Either, then, Hegel’s philosophy has 
no value or he must have meant by ‘contradiction’ something different from what 
formal logicians mean by it. It is likely enough that it is the second alternative that is 
correct. In attacking Dühring, Engels seems to have committed himself to the first 
alternative. He adopted a speculative, nonempirical thesis, for whereas movement is 
something that can be observed in natural things and events, contradiction is not 
observable in them. What Engels did in his argument about contradiction in the nature 
of things was to provide one of Zeno’s paradoxes with a merely verbal, and indeed 
absurd, ‘solution’.” (Acton 2006) 
Engels along with Hegel seems to have erred in taking ‘contradiction’ as applied to objective 
world to mean ‘logical contradiction’ in respect of motion; it may however be argued that 
Engels erred only in choosing his terminology; having been carried away by his Hegelian 
loyalty, he appears to have been eager to use Hegelian wordings, already pregnant with 
unnecessary blanks. This will become clear if we read his above passage along with his brief 
note for Chapter 12 given in his Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring: 
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“Antithesis – if a thing is saddled with its antithesis, it is in contradiction with itself, 
and so is its expression in thought. For example, there is a contradiction in a thing 
remaining the same and yet constantly changing, being possessed of the antithesis of 
‘inertness’ and ‘change’.” (Engels 1878 [1947]; emphasis added.) 
This brief note clearly shows Engels was in good command of the concept of contradiction in 
the framework of the dialectical triad. Why then he chose to describe contradiction in motion 
in terms of the uncrackable Hegelian wordings when he could have explained it in the above 
line of reasoning remains a mystery. Anyhow, unaware of the consequences, he went on to 
the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, according to which certain changes in 
nature involve “qualitative leap” rather than gradual accretion, and like Hegel, gave  
“one of the best-known examples – that of the change of the aggregate states of water, 
which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0° C from the liquid into the 
solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these 
turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a 
qualitative change in the condition of the water.” (Engels 1878 [1947]) 
He then took up the footnote added by Marx to the third edition of Capital: “The molecular 
theory of modern chemistry first scientifically worked out by Laurent and Gerhardt rests on 
no other law”, and provided a detailed explanation: 
“What is referred to here is the homologous series of carbon compounds, of which a 
great many are already known and each of which has its own algebraic formula of 
composition. If, for example, as is done in chemistry, we denote an atom of carbon by 
C, an atom of hydrogen by H, an atom of oxygen by O, and the number of atoms of 
carbon contained in each compound by n, the molecular formulas for some of these 
series can be expressed as follows: 
CnH2n+2 — the series of normal paraffins 
CnH2n+2O — the series of primary alcohols 
CnH2nO2 — the series of the monobasic fatty acids. 
Let us take as an example the last of these series, and let us assume successively that n 
= l, n = 2, n = 3, etc. We then obtain the following results (omitting the isomers): 
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CH2O2 — formic acid:  boiling point 100°; melting point 1° 
C2H4O2 — acetic acid:  boiling point 118°; melting point 17° 
C3H6O2 — propionic acid:  boiling point 140°; melting point —  
C8H8O2 — butyric acid:  boiling point 162°; melting point — 
C5H10O2 — valerianic acid:  boiling point 175°; melting point — 
and so on to C50H60O2, melissic acid, which melts only at 80° and has no boiling point 
at all, because it cannot evaporate without disintegrating. 
Here therefore we have a whole series of qualitatively different bodies, formed by the 
simple quantitative addition of elements, and in fact always in the same proportion. 
This is most clearly evident in cases where the quantity of all the elements of the 
compound changes in the same proportion. Thus, in the normal paraffins CnH2n+2, the 
lowest is methane, CH4, a gas; the highest known, hexadecane, C16H34, is a solid body 
forming colourless crystals which melts at 21° and boils only at 278°. Each new 
member of both series comes into existence through the addition of CH2, one atom of 
carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular formula of the preceding 
member, and this quantitative change in the molecular formula produces each time a 
qualitatively different body. 
These series, however, are only one particularly obvious example; throughout 
practically the whole of chemistry, even in the various nitrogen oxides and oxygen 
acids of phosphorus or sulphur, one can see how “quantity changes into quality”, and 
this allegedly confused, hazy Hegelian notion appears in so to speak corporeal form in 
things and processes – and no one but Herr Dühring is confused and befogged by it. 
And if Marx was the first to call attention to it, and if Herr Dühring read the reference 
without even understanding it (otherwise he would certainly not have allowed this 
unparalleled outrage to pass unchallenged), this is enough – even without looking 
back at the famous Dühringian philosophy of nature – to make it clear which of the 
two, Marx or Herr Dühring, is lacking in “the eminently modern educative elements 
provided by the natural-scientific mode of thought” and in acquaintance with the 
“main achievements of ... chemistry”.” (Engels 1878 [1947]) 
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It is interesting to compare these passages with those of Hegel (quoted above) for originality 
of idea. 
The second law, that of the interpenetration of opposites, which is now called the law of the 
unity and struggle of opposites, was explicated in terms of contradiction, which we have 
already discussed. It should be noted that this law did not receive as much attention from 
Engels as the other two (with two separate chapters devoted to them in Anti-Dühring).  
The third law, that of the negation of the negation, occupies the entire Chapter 13 of Anti-
Dühring. Engels characterised it as a  
“very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any 
child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was 
enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of 
helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring’s calibre to keep it enveloped”, 
and continued vigorously with numerous examples: 
“Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and 
brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which 
are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and 
moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to 
exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the 
negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, 
flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as 
these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of 
the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, 
but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the 
barley of today is almost the same as it was a century ago. But if we take a plastic 
ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant 
which grows from it according to the gardener’s art, we get as a result of this negation 
of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which 
produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh 
negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection.   
“With most insects, this process follows the same lines as in the case of the grain of 
barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by a negation of the egg, pass 
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through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn 
negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has 
laid its numerous eggs. We are not concerned at the moment with the fact that with 
other plants and animals the process does not take such a simple form, that before 
they die they produce seeds, eggs or offspring not once but many times; our purpose 
here is only to show that the negation of the negation really does take place in both 
kingdoms of the organic world. Furthermore, the whole of geology is a series of 
negated negations, a series of successive chatterings of old and deposits of new rock 
formations. First the original earth crust brought into existence by the cooling of the 
liquid mass was broken up by oceanic, meteorological and atmospherico-chemical 
action, and these fragmented masses were stratified on the ocean bed. Local upheavals 
of the ocean bed above the surface of the sea subject portions of these first strata once 
more to the action of rain, the changing temperature of the seasons and the oxygen 
and carbonic acid of the atmosphere. These same influences act on the molten masses 
of rock which issue from the interior of the earth, break through the strata and 
subsequently cool off. In this way, in the course of millions of centuries, ever new 
strata are formed and in turn are for the most part destroyed, ever anew serving as 
material for the formation of new strata. But the result of this process has been a very 
positive one: the creation of a soil composed of the most varied chemical elements 
and mechanically fragmented, which makes possible the most abundant and 
diversified vegetation. 
“It is the same in mathematics. Let us take any algebraic quantity whatever: for 
example, a. If this is negated, we get -a (minus a). If we negate that negation, by 
multiplying -a by -a, we get +a2, i.e., the original positive quantity, but at a higher 
degree, raised to its second power. In this case also it makes no difference that we can 
obtain the same a2 by multiplying the positive a by itself, thus likewise getting a2. For 
the negated negation is so securely entrenched in a2 that the latter always has two 
square roots, namely, a and -a. And the fact that it is impossible to get rid of the 
negated negation, the negative root of the square, acquires very obvious significance 
as soon as we come to quadratic equations.  
“The negation of the negation is even more strikingly obvious in higher analysis, in 
those “summations of indefinitely small magnitudes”, which Herr Dühring himself 
declares are the highest operations of mathematics, and in ordinary language are 
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known as the differential and integral calculus. How are these forms of calculus used? 
In a given problem, for example, I have two variables, x and y, neither of which can 
vary without the other also varying in a ratio determined by the facts of the case. I 
differentiate x and y, i.e., I take x and y as so infinitely small that in comparison with 
any real quantity, however small, they disappear, that nothing is left of x and y but 
their reciprocal relation without any, so to speak, material basis, a quantitative ratio in 
which there is no quantity. Therefore, dy/dx, the ratio between the differentials of x 
and y, is dx equal to 0/0 but 0/0 taken as the expression of y/x. I only mention in 
passing that this ratio between two quantities which have disappeared, caught at the 
moment of their disappearance, is a contradiction; however, it cannot disturb us any 
more than it has disturbed the whole of mathematics for almost two hundred years. 
And now, what have I done but negate x and y, though not in such a way that I need 
not bother about them any more, not in the way that metaphysics negates, but in the 
way that corresponds with the facts of the case? In place of x and y, therefore, I have 
their negation, dx and dy, in the formulas or equations before me. I continue then to 
operate with these formulas, treating dx and dy as quantities which are real, though 
subject to certain exceptional laws, and at a certain point I negate the negation, i.e., I 
integrate the differential formula, and in place of dx and dy again get the real 
quantities x and y, and am then not where I was at the beginning, but by using this 
method I have solved the problem on which ordinary geometry and algebra might 
perhaps have broken their jaws in vain. 
“It is the same in history, as well. All civilised peoples begin with the common 
ownership of the land. With all peoples who have passed a certain primitive stage, this 
common ownership becomes in the course of the development of agriculture a fetter 
on production. It is abolished, negated, and after a longer or shorter series of 
intermediate stages is transformed into private property. But at a higher stage of 
agricultural development, brought about by private property in land itself, private 
property conversely becomes a fetter on production, as is the case today both with 
small and large landownership. The demand that it, too, should be negated, that it 
should once again be transformed into common property, necessarily arises. But this 
demand does not mean the restoration of the aboriginal common ownership, but the 
institution of a far higher and more developed form of possession in common which, 
far from being a hindrance to production, on the contrary for the first time will free 
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production from all fetters and enable it to make full use of modern chemical 
discoveries and mechanical inventions. 
“Or let us take another example: The philosophy of antiquity was primitive, 
spontaneously evolved materialism. As such, it was incapable of clearing up the 
relation between mind and matter. But the need to get clarity on this question led to 
the doctrine of a soul separable from the body, then to the assertion of the immortality 
of this soul, and finally to monotheism. The old materialism was therefore negated by 
idealism. But in the course of the further development of philosophy, idealism, too, 
became untenable and was negated by modern materialism. This modern materialism, 
the negation of the negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but adds to 
the permanent foundations of this old materialism the whole thought-content of two 
thousand years of development of philosophy and natural science, as well as of the 
history of these two thousand years. It is no longer a philosophy at all, but simply a 
world outlook which has to establish its validity and be applied not in a science of 
sciences standing apart, but in the real sciences. Philosophy is therefore “sublated” 
here, that is, “both overcome and preserved”; overcome as regards its form, and 
preserved as regards its real content. Thus, where Herr Dühring sees only “verbal 
jugglery”, closer inspection reveals an actual content.” (Engels 1878 [1947]). 
His enthusiasm refused to break the flow of instances. The final one was on Rousseau’s 
doctrine of inequality, characterized as containing an antagonistic contradiction of both 
progress or “perfection of the individual man” and retrogression of the human race; the 
contradiction intensifies 
“up to the point at which inequality, carried to the utmost extreme, again changes into 
its opposite, becomes the cause of equality ….. not, however, ….  the former naive 
equality of speechless primitive men, but …. the higher equality of the social contract. 
The oppressors are oppressed. It is the negation of the negation.” (Engels 1878 
[1947]). 
Then he summed up the law: 
“An extremely general – and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important – 
law of development of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, 
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holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history 
and in philosophy.” (Engels 1878 [1947]), 
Interestingly, Engels went on to draw a parallel between Rousseau and Marx in that 
“in Rousseau … we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the 
one developed in Marx’s Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same 
dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are 
antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; 
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation” (Engels 
1878 [1947]), 
even though Rousseau was speaking “sixteen years before Hegel was born”.  
It should be noted that Plekhanov found Engels’ third law of dialectics, the negation of the 
negation, as superfluous, because it was already contained in the law of the interpenetration 
of opposites. Moreover, he also changed the order of the remaining two laws of dialectics as 
given by Engels by giving priority to the law of the interpenetration of opposites over the law 
of the transition of quantity into quality. This he did with a deliberate view to highlighting the 
burning truth of universal conflict and contradiction as an inevitable background for a social-
political movement based on class struggle.  
Lenin 
Lenin was whole-heartedly quick to copy all of Plekhanov’s revisions of dialectical 
materialism and took them up to the extent of creating a new dialectical materialism, different 
from that of Engels, such that it has come to be called Leninism. It is interesting to note that 
he accomplished this in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in the name of defending 
Engels’ original ideas from misrepresentation by revisionists, especially, the Russian 
Machians. Lenin was so tactful in expounding his own revisionism with the full Marxian 
colour and vigour that no one would find any difference from the original doctrines of Marx 
and Engels. John Plamenatz (1954) aptly writes: 
“Lenin imagined himself the servant of an infallible doctrine which he alone could 
interpret; and so could afford to be always modest and yet always right. “It is not I but 
Marx” or “It is not I but Engels who says”: these are the unseen beginnings of all his 
arguments; and their perpetual conclusion: “and therefore I am right”.” 
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Now coming back to Engels, it is quite ironical that in spite of so much hard work and 
substantial contributions, the posterity cared little to honour this humane genius by crediting 
to him a place beside Marx; despite his own admission that “I cannot deny that both before 
and during my 40 years’ collaboration with Marx, I had a certain independent share in laying 
the foundation of the theory, and more particularly in its elaboration” (quoted at the outset of 
this Chapter; Engels 1886 [1970]; emphasis added), the doctrine, however, went on by the 
name of Marxism, not by Marx-Engelsism, not even by Marxism-Engelsism. His name 
remained as a simple appendage to Marx, without an independent identity. His unusually 
submissive humility and unwavering loyalty to Marx (or was he afraid of that aggressive 
personality?) had umpteen times declared himself as inferior to Marx – “What Marx 
accomplished I would not have achieved. Marx stood higher, saw further, and took a wider 
and quicker view than all the rest of us. Marx was a genius; we others were at best talented.” 
(ibid.) He had even gone to the extreme of abdicating his “independent share” – “Without 
him [Marx] the theory would not be by far what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his 
name.” (ibid.)  And the posterity appears to have taken his words seriously. Even though he 
had tried during his whole life to fill in the possible Marxian blanks with his writings, he was 
not accorded a place among the ‘founding fathers’ of this doctrine. Rather that credit went to 
Lenin to make up the doctrine by the name of Marxism-Leninism. 
Lenin’s main contributions to dialectical materialism were the doctrine of partiinost, and his 
dialectical analysis of the theory of knowledge and of matter.  
Partiinost 
As mentioned earlier in a footnote, Lenin found in Plekhanov sufficient justification for 
highlighting the universal fact of conflict and contradiction as an inevitable background for a 
social-political movement based on class struggle. From this he derived his doctrine of 
partiinost. Variously defined as ‘membership in a political party’, or ‘party spirit, or 
partisanship’, the term has come to represent an important concept in the communist 
intellectual life. The doctrine was formulated by Lenin as early as 1895, in the course of a 
controversy with Peter Berngardovich Struve (1870 –1944; a Russian nonorthodox Marxist 
reformer-turned liberal and editor), who had in his critique of Narodism quoted the view that 
“there are no insurmountable historical tendencies which, as such, should serve on the 
one hand as a starting-point, and on the other as unavoidable bounds to the purposeful 
activity of individuals and social groups” (quoted in Lenin 1894 [1972]). 
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And Lenin pointed out that  
“That is the language of an objectivist, and not of a Marxist (materialist). Between 
these conceptions (systems of views) there is a difference, which should be dwelt on, 
since an incomplete grasp of this difference is one of the fundamental defects of Mr. 
Struve’s book and manifests itself in the majority of his arguments.  
“The objectivist speaks of the necessity of a given historical process; the materialist 
gives an exact picture of the given social-economic formation and of the antagonistic 
relations to which it gives rise. When demonstrating the necessity for a given series of 
facts, the objectivist always runs the risk of becoming an apologist for these facts: the 
materialist discloses the class contradictions and in so doing defines his standpoint. 
The objectivist speaks of “insurmountable historical tendencies”; the materialist 
speaks of the class which “directs” the given economic system, giving rise to such and 
such forms of counteraction by other classes. Thus, on the one hand, the materialist is 
more consistent than the objectivist, and gives profounder and fuller effect to his 
objectivism. He does not limit himself to speaking of the necessity of a process, but 
ascertains exactly what social-economic formation gives the process its content, 
exactly what class determines this necessity. In the present case, for example, the 
materialist would not content himself with stating the “insurmountable historical 
tendencies,” but would point to the existence of certain classes, which determine the 
content of the given system and preclude the possibility of any solution except by the 
action of the producers themselves. On the other hand, materialism includes 
partisanship, so to speak, and enjoins the direct and open adoption of the standpoint of 
a definite social group in any assessment of events.” (ibid.). 
Thus started his attack on ideas put forward in the name of disinterested objectivity. 
According to Marxian theory, ideologies in a class-divided society are systems of ideas 
functioning to defend and to justify class interests. Philosophical systems are ideologies in 
this sense to serve class interests. Bourgeois ideologies, howsoever much they look 
harmlessly impartial, do stand to promote bourgeois interests; the same story runs for any 
ideology throughout the history of antagonistic class society: in the slave-owning and the 
later feudal societies, the ruling class interests predominated in various trends of philosophy 
and socio-political thought. Against this was the ideological struggle of the interests of the 
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oppressed classes. The emergence of utopian socialism and Marxism was a reflection of such 
ideological struggle.  
Thus disinterested objectivity in ideology loses its ground in a class-torn society. Anyone 
with some thinking capacity cannot remain uncommitted to one or the other class, and thus to 
one or the other ideology, depending upon his interests knowingly or unknowingly. If his 
interests are in line with the development of society, he falls in the progressive against the 
reactionary class. With the rise of the proletariat as a revolutionary force and Marxism, as the 
scientific ideology for social development, no genuine adherent of materialism could remain 
uncommitted to the proletarian cause; thus Lenin seems to have focussed primarily on the 
Marxist doctrine of the unity of theory and practice for the establishment of socialism. This 
means a dialectical materialist is necessarily a socialist, and his world view (theory) is 
inseparable from his efforts (practice) to promote the proletarian cause. Similarly, a socialist 
intellectual cannot be indifferent to philosophy, or more precisely, uncommitted to 
materialism. Thus a true socialist is necessarily a materialist, and a materialist of the right 
one, the dialectical materialism. This in turn means that partiinost is included in dialectical 
materialism. Thus Lenin did not hesitate to send strong signals to caution the socialist leaders 
against philosophical idealism contaminating their theory, and this later on led to Stalin’s 
infamous preoccupation in terms of state-control of intellectual activity.   
This doctrine of partiinost was powerfully expressed in Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism:  Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy (1908). He took it into his head 
that certain members of the Russian Social Democratic party, “Bazarov, Bogdanov, 
Yushkevich, Valentinov, Chernov  and other Machians” (Lenin 1908 [1947]), were actively 
engaged in spreading essentially idealist views “in the name of “seeking” Marxists” … 
“under the guise of “proletarian culture””, and he took it upon himself to put them right. 
These “would-be Marxists”, according to him, were adopting, in the name of empirio-
criticism, the phenomenalist theories of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. He wrote: 
“All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels 
scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these 
people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their 
hostility towards dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in 
philosophy! Engels’ dialectics is “mysticism,” says Berman. Engels’ views have 
become “antiquated,” remarks Bazarov casually, as though it were a self-evident fact. 
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Materialism thus appears to be refuted by our bold warriors, who proudly allude to the 
“modern theory of knowledge,” “recent philosophy” (or “recent positivism"), the 
“philosophy of modern natural science,” or even the “philosophy of natural science of 
the twentieth century.” Supported by all these supposedly recent doctrines, our 
destroyers of dialectical materialism proceed fearlessly to downright fideism…” 
(Lenin 1908 [1947]).  
He continued to dub their attitude  
“typical philosophical revisionism, for it was only the revisionists who gained a sad 
notoriety for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism 
and by their fear, or inability, to “settle accounts” openly, explicitly, resolutely and 
clearly with the views they had abandoned.” (Lenin 1908 [1947]). 
It was to contain this revisionism that he put up the concept of partiinost in this work, which 
in effect became an intolerance approach intended to crush any view held to be dangerous to 
the party, any revisionism other than his own. This he effected efficiently with the authority 
of Marxism; he wrote a separate section on “Parties in Philosophy ….”; here he reiterated his 
assertion on the “two great camps” among the philosophers. In the second chapter on “The 
Theory of Knowledge….”, he had already explained it: 
“In his Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels declares that the fundamental philosophical trends 
are materialism and idealism. Materialism regards nature as primary and spirit as 
secondary; it places being first and thought second. Idealism holds the contrary view. 
This root distinction between the “two great camps” into which the philosophers of 
the “various schools” of idealism and materialism are divided Engels takes as the 
cornerstone, and he directly charges with “confusion” those who use the terms 
idealism and materialism in any other way.” (Lenin ibid). 
Then in the section on “Parties in Philosophy ….”, he traced the struggle between these two 
camps, materialism and idealism,  
“in connection with every problem of epistemology touched upon and in connection 
with every philosophical question raised by the new physics…... Behind the mass of 
new terminological devices, behind the litter of erudite scholasticism, we invariably 
discerned two principal alignments, two fundamental trends in the solution of 
philosophical problems. Whether nature, matter, the physical, the external world 
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should be taken as primary, and consciousness, mind,   sensation (experience—as the 
widespread terminology of our time has it), the psychical, etc., should be regarded as 
secondary—that is the root question which in fact continues to divide the philosophers 
into two great camps. The source of thousands upon thousands of errors and of the 
confusion reigning in this sphere is the fact that beneath the envelope of terms, 
definitions, scholastic devices and verbal artifices, these two fundamental trends are 
overlooked.” (Lenin ibid). 
He argued that all the “philosophical utterances” of both Marx and Engels did “revolve 
within these two fundamental opposites”. It was self-delusion or hypocrisy to expect a 
possible disinterested third party in philosophy.  And he continued to admit: 
“Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start to finish; they were able to 
detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism and fideism in 
each and every one of the “recent” trends.”.  
One of his main purposes in bringing out this work was to correlate the historical struggle 
between these two philosophical camps with the class struggle between the exploited and the 
exploiters. However, thought control process was not an immediate agenda of the October 
Revolution; in fact in his struggle for capturing and keeping the state power, Lenin welcomed 
into his party and tolerated many intellectuals who were at loggerheads with him 
ideologically, even though from day one itself the Soviet State repressed political opposition, 
both physical and theoretical, and non-political thought too. The state of lull with Lenin’s 
broad sense of the concept of party-mindedness continued till 1929, Stalin’s ‘year of the great 
break’, when he complained that the intellectuals were not serving the party adequately; he 
therefore demanded complete subjection of intellectual life to continuous direct control by the 
Central Committee.  
Thus started the era of the Big Brother.   
Lenin’s Epistemology: Knowledge and Matter 
Besides the doctrine of partiinost, Lenin’s main contribution to dialectical materialism was 
his dialectical analysis of the theory of knowledge and the nature of matter, as discussed in 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.  
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As already implied, the primitive character of Engels’ epistemology had left many a blank 
that in the background of the developments in atomic physics around the turn of the 20th 
century stood to contribute significantly to the rise of revisionist movements within Russian 
Marxism under the garb of empirio-criticism. Lenin felt challenged to counter their 
epistemological contentions. It should be noted that his monograph contains no explicit 
section dealing directly with the philosophy of nature; but he touched upon the subject to 
such an extent that he distinguished (in chapter five: ‘The Recent Revolution of Natural 
Science and Philosophical Idealism’, following the book The Physical Theory of the Modern 
Physicists of Abel Rey, a French “writer on philosophical problems”) between a 
“philosophical” and a “scientific” conception of matter. The former is concerned with the 
distinction between materialism and idealism while the latter deals just with the “structure of 
matter” (atoms and sub-atomic particles), that is, the decisive aspect of the former, 
philosophical conception of matter, is not the identification of matter with elementary 
particles, but the recognition of matter as objective reality, existing “independently of our 
consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us”. He put forward two more 
“important epistemological conclusions”:  
(i) “There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the 
thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between 
what is known and what is not yet known.”  
And (ii) “In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must 
think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and 
unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how 
incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.” (ibid.) 
What follows according to him is that  
“dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every 
scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence 
of absolute boundaries in nature”,  
that is,  
“[t]he “essence” of things, or “substance,” is also relative; it expresses only the degree 
of profundity of man’s knowledge of objects; and while yesterday the profundity of 
this knowledge did not go beyond the atom, and today does not go beyond the 
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electron and ether, dialectical materialism insists on the temporary, relative, 
approximate character of all these milestones in the knowledge of nature gained by 
the progressing science of man.”. 
Thus for Lenin, the concept of matter “epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality 
existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it”. Based on this conception he 
was then able to refute (in chapter five, section two) the argument of the “disappearance of 
matter”, that as “atom dematerialises … matter disappears”, giving way to electricity. Joseph 
Diner-Denes had in an article in Die Neue Zeit (1906-07) already answered to this argument 
pointing out that “light and electricity are only manifestations of one and the same force of 
nature”. Following him, Lenin explained that 
““Matter disappears” means that the limit within which we have hitherto known 
matter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter 
are likewise disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary 
(impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and 
characteristic only of certain states of matter.”.   
As usual, Lenin here invoked an example given by Engels of the discovery of alizarin in coal 
tar in the context of his criticism of mechanical materialism. He asked: 
“What is the kernel of Engels’ objections? Yesterday we did not know that coal tar 
contained alizarin. Today we learned that it does. The question is, did coal tar contain 
alizarin yesterday?  
“Of course it did. To doubt it would be to make a mockery of modern science.”  
Hence he was prompted to ask: 
“Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or 
not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do 
invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature 
existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in 
favour of materialism.” 
This in essence was his “philosophical” account of matter, in contrast to the “scientific” 
conception of matter, which changes as scientific knowledge advances. In Lenin’s view, the 
question of whether something exists outside and independently of our consciousness must be 
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separated from the question of how it exists and what its structure must be. The relativity of 
our knowledge about the structure of matter by no means contradicts our acceptance of an 
objective reality, while the philosophical conception of that structure yields an orientation for 
further scientific research. That is, the philosophical conception of matter remains unaffected 
as the scientific view of it changes from atomist theories to theories of electromagnetism. He 
argued that the electromagnetic theory of matter is no less materialistic than atomic theories 
and indeed it is in closer accord with dialectical materialism. So he asserted that “[m]odern 
physics is in travail; it is giving birth to dialectical materialism”. 
The dialectical approach of Engels and Lenin that the development of science occurs through 
the progressive passage of some theories into more general and deeper ones, qualitatively 
different from the earlier, was closely followed by all the Soviet philosophers of science (for 
example, see Omelyanovsky 1979). This dialectics is marked by a continuous process of 
disappearance of certain basic concepts and appearance of new basic concepts in which the 
earlier absolute or invariant concepts undergo a kind of relativisation and become aspects of 
new absolute or invariant concepts in a more general theory. Thus it is argued that in the 
theory of relativity, for instance, the concepts of absolute space and absolute time accepted in 
the classical mechanics disappeared, and relativistic concepts of space and time became 
established; they represent the aspects of one of the most important invariants in the theory of 
relativity – the four-dimensional time which represents a special ‘continuum’ of space and 
time. Similarly, in quantum mechanics the absolute nature of the corpuscular and wave 
concepts inherent in them in the classical theory was lost, and they have become relative 
ones, as aspects of a broader concept of a particle with certain invariant characteristics. 
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